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Executive summary 1
Executive summary
Recent years have witnessed renewed interest in ‘inclusive business models’ in
agriculture, as part of wider discussions about growing agricultural investment in
lower income countries. Inclusive models aim to include poor people into value
chains as producers, employees or consumers, in ways that are both equitable and
sustainable. Joint ventures between companies and local communities have
received considerable attention in these debates.
This report presents findings from research on joint ventures in South Africa’s
agricultural sector. The South African experience presents major specificities linked
to its history and its recent land reform programme, within which experience with joint
ventures has emerged. But it also provides a case where joint ventures have been
implemented for some time, and some of the lessons learned may prove valuable for
different contexts where discussions about joint ventures are more recent.
Under South Africa’s land reform programme, since 1994, previously dispossessed
communities have had large areas of agricultural land restored to them and, under
pressure from the state, have entered into a range of joint enterprises with
commercial partners. Early evidence suggests that these enterprises face multiple
difficulties, and the report provides a cautionary tale for international discussions
about inclusive business models.
This report is based on two case studies of land reform in Limpopo province, Levubu
and Moletele. In these sites, large areas of high-value irrigated land have been
restored to relatively poor communities. In order to maintain the productivity of
commercial farming enterprises, and to maximise long-term benefits for their
members, these communities have entered into contractual arrangements with so-
called ‘strategic partners’, most of which take the form of joint ventures. While the
state funds the land transfer and provides certain start-up grants, the strategic
partner is expected to provide technical and managerial expertise and arrange
access to commercial sources of credit. In return, the strategic partners expect to
benefit from a share of profits, a management fee and opportunities for additional
upstream and downstream activities. Communities stand to benefit from land rentals
and a share of operating profits, as well as jobs and training opportunities for their
members.
The findings of the Levubu and Moletele case studies show that joint ventures have
struggled to get off the ground and some have already collapsed with major losses.
Apart from some limited employment opportunities, few if any benefits have yet
reached ordinary community members. In some cases, employment and productivity
on the farms has declined severely. Overly complex deals, ineffective support from
the responsible state agencies and lack of capacity on the part of commercial
partners stand out as the main factors contributing to the failure of the joint venture
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model in the South African context. Alternative policies will need to address all these
areas, which places responsibilities on state agencies, communities and their
commercial partners to develop more plausible models that adequately address both
equity and sustainability. Key to this will be the choice of commercial partners, who
should ideally have sufficient resources to fund a venture throughout a prolonged
start-phase and a demonstrable commitment to an inclusive business approach. For
the communities, the key challenge will be to ensure a flow of material benefits to
their members in both the short and the longer terms, while developing capacity and
a clear strategy for the eventual assumption of full control of farming operations. 
Over time, a variety of alternatives to joint ventures has emerged on the land, ranging
from direct use by community members to management contracts and lease
agreements with outsiders, with mixed results. Two relatively successful cases are
identified where communities have entered into partnerships with experienced
individuals who act as managers and mentors. While this puts the communities in a
relatively strong position, at least on paper, they continue to face major difficulties in
accessing working capital. Another model that has more recently emerged at
Moletele is the so-called Community-Private Partnership, which is effectively a
standard lease agreement with an agri-business company, with the added promise
of employment and training opportunities for community members. This differs from
the former strategic partnership/joint venture model in that the operating company is
controlled entirely by the commercial partner and the community does not receive a
share of profits; it also releases the community from the requirement that it match the
capital invested by partners under the joint venture model. While the Community-
Private model appears to be less complex than a strategic partnership and less risky
for the community, it is too early to say whether it is capable of delivering a
sustainable stream of benefits to community members. Questions also remain
regarding the long term development of the land and arrangements for the return of
the farms to community control at the end of 20-year leases.
1. Introduction 3
1. Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed renewed interest in ‘inclusive business models’ in
agriculture, as part of wider discussions about growing agricultural investment in
lower income countries. Inclusive business models aim to include poor people into
value chains as producers, employees or consumers, in ways that are both equitable
and sustainable (UNDP, 2010: 3). Inclusive business models in the agricultural
sector are widely seen as a means of providing access to capital, information and
markets for smallholders and communities who may otherwise be marginalised from
the economic mainstream and are therefore seen by many as an effective means of
rural development. Such initiatives can see resource-poor producers and
communities partnering with multi-national companies, large domestic companies,
small or medium sized enterprise, or non-profit organisations. Joint ventures between
companies and local communities have received considerable attention in recent
debates about inclusive models in agriculture.
This report presents findings from research on joint ventures in South Africa’s
agricultural sector. The South African experience presents major specificities linked
to its history and its recent land reform programme, within which experience with joint
ventures has emerged. In contrast to other parts of the world, South Africa provides
an example of communities that, as the result of a political transformation, have come
into possession of large, valuable agricultural assets, to which they have secured
freehold title but often lack the necessary management and financial resources, and
are therefore in need of commercial partners. The commercial partners that have
linked up with such communities are also atypical in that many are relatively small in
scale and some are former owners of the land in question. In the partnerships, local
communities are thrust into collective participation in new and complex enterprises,
rather than building on familiar household-based activities. And the driving force
behind the new ventures is the state, through policy, brokering and the provision of
substantial capital; however, the state does not play an active part in the operation of
the enterprises.
Despite these unique features, South Africa provides a case where ‘strategic
partnerships’ between companies and local communities, including in the form of
joint ventures, have been implemented for some time. Some of the lessons learned in
this country may prove valuable for different contexts where discussions about
partnerships in general, and joint ventures in particular, are more recent.
In South Africa, since the end of Apartheid in 1994, a wide range of state, community
and private sector initiatives have aimed to redistribute wealth and extend social and
economic opportunities to previously disadvantaged people of colour. One such
policy is land reform, which aims to redistribute agricultural land among the wider
population, restore ancestral lands to individuals and communities, and strengthen
land rights more generally. The highly-developed nature of the commercial
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agricultural sector in South Africa provides opportunities for previously marginalised
groups to engage in production of high-value commodities for domestic and
international markets, but also presents major challenges in terms of capital, skills
and competitiveness. It is in this context that a variety of ‘strategic partnerships’ have
emerged between (largely poor) black landowning communities and (mostly white)
partners from the large-scale commercial sector, many of which take the form of joint
ventures.
This report examines two clusters of strategic partnerships from the sub-tropical fruit
and nut zone in Limpopo province, in the north-east of South Africa, where land
reform has led to the transfer of large areas of commercial farm land to previously-
dispossessed communities over the past five years (see Figure 1). The Levubu and
Moletele case studies reveal many of the difficulties of creating viable partnerships
and delivering on the promises of land reform, but also show how ambitious plans
have, over time, given way to more realistic expectations and a greater diversity of
business models.
The report draws on ongoing fieldwork by all three authors in the study area dating
back to the 1990s, but the evidence presented here is based mainly on research
conducted at Levubu and Moletele during the period June-December 2010. During
this time, face-to-face interviews and/or group discussions were conducted with
most of the key players involved with the various enterprises under investigation,
including community leaders, commercial partners, farm managers, workers, state
officials (from national, provincial and local levels), ‘ordinary’ community members
and other knowledgeable individuals. 
For practical reasons, it was not possible to look at all the ventures at Levubu and
Moletele in equal detail. For the purposes of this report, particular attention is given to
one of the Levubu communities – Ravele – and, in the case of Moletele, to the
strategic partnership known as New Dawn, although some relevant information on
the other enterprises in these areas is also included.
In most cases the researchers were given access to company records, including
accounts, minutes of meetings and business plans. Official records, setting out the
areas of land and the financial details of the land reform settlements, were also
accessed. While communication with community members was generally excellent,
a number of difficulties were encountered in communicating with some of the
commercial partners, either because the companies in question had collapsed, key
individuals had left the area or, in a few cases, people were unwilling to participate in
the study. As a result, this study is best seen as ‘community perspectives on joint
ventures in land reform’, rather than a fully-rounded study of business operations. A
further limitation of the study is the absence of reliable information on some key
issues, either because it was not recorded, people were unwilling to share it, or the
accuracy was contested. Such issues included how certain monies paid over to
community structures have been used, how certain state grants have been used,
and the wider financial and business dealings of some of the commercial partners.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. Location of the study sites
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comprehensive – account of what has happened over the past five years at Levubu
and Moletele, which continues to be a sometimes chaotic and somewhat fraught
land reform experiment. Where there are substantial information gaps, or confusion,
these largely reflect the perspective of the community informants involved.
This report begins by setting out the context for these types of joint ventures, within
the context of the South African land reform programme (Chapter 2). Particular
attention is paid to the restitution dimension of land reform, which aims to return
ancestral land – much of it now highly developed – to former owners, many of them
large and relatively poor communities. The two case studies of Levubu and Moletele
are then considered in turn (Chapters 3 and 4), looking at the land in question, the
communities and other actors involved, the nature of the business partnerships that
have been created and the success or otherwise of these partnerships to date.
Chapter 5 presents a comparative analysis of these two cases, looking in some
detail at the emerging business models, the benefits to the communities, links
between agricultural production and other (upstream and downstream) commercial
activities, the role of Communal Property Associations (CPAs) within the respective
communities and, finally, the impact on workers and employment. Chapter 6
summarises the main findings of the study, situating the South African experience in
the wider international context, and presents a number of policy recommendations.
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2. Strategic partnerships in South Africa’s land reform
Strategic partnerships in land reform in South Africa are part of a wider response to
the challenge of empowering previously marginalised groups and transforming the
racially-stratified economy inherited from the Apartheid era. In distinction to the way
in which the term is used in the international business literature, the term ‘strategic
partnership’ is used here (and widely in South Africa) to signify a joint venture or
other form of collaboration between an established commercial firm and a new (or
‘emerging’) group of workers, shareholders, small farmers, entrepreneurs or
community members with limited commercial experience and little or no access to
finance or leading-edge markets. Such collaborations typically have social as well as
economic objectives, including empowerment of workers, women or other previously
disadvantaged groups, skills transfer, accelerated career paths and creation of
trading opportunities for small and micro enterprises. This in turn forms part of the
state’s wider programme of broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (BEE)
which is being implemented across the wider economy.
Land reform is an integral part of the democratisation of South Africa and transition
from the race-based Apartheid system which prevailed until 1994. The need for
radical reform of property rights has been acknowledged across the political
spectrum, and features prominently in the Constitution of South Africa as well as a
range of legislation and official policies. This is a direct response to the long history of
settler-colonialism, accompanied by violent dispossession and exploitation of
indigenous peoples that left South Africa with a highly unequal distribution of wealth
and assets. By the end of the Apartheid era, approximately 86% of all agricultural
land in the country was held by white people (who accounted for only 10.9% of the
population) and was concentrated in the hands of approximately 60,000 owners
(Lahiff, 2007: 1578). 
In 1994, the new democratically-elected government, led by the African National
Congress (ANC), pledged to transfer at least 30% of agricultural land to black
people. Since then, the state has implemented a multifaceted programme of land
reform that includes redistribution of land (whereby beneficiaries access grants to
allow for purchase of land via the market), restitution (involving the return of ancestral
lands to individuals or communities with a proven historical claim) and tenure reform
(aimed at securing the property rights of people living within communal areas and on
privately-owned commercial farms) (Department of Land Affairs, 1997). Despite
some progress, and substantial budgetary allocations, there is a widespread
perception that land reform is not meeting its objectives in terms of economic
development, poverty alleviation or redress for past injustices, although intense
debate rages around the reasons for such failures (Greenberg, 2010; Centre for
Development and Enterprise, 2008).
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Most public attention, both within the country and internationally, has focused on the
means by which land is acquired from the existing white owners and the levels of
compensation, if any, to be paid. Under the Constitution, the state has the power to
expropriate land for land reform purposes and a duty to provide compensation that is
‘just and equitable’, taking into consideration factors such as the means by which the
land was first acquired and levels of state subsidy accrued, as well as the current
market value. In practice, the South African state has relied heavily on the system of
‘willing seller, willing buyer’, inspired by the World Bank’s model of market-based land
reform, largely eschewing expropriation in favour of voluntary transactions with
compensation at prevailing market rates (Deininger, 2003; van den Brink et al.,
2006). By the end of September 2009, just 6.9% of the country’s farmland 
(5.67 million hectares out of a total of approximately 82 million) had been transferred,
to 1.78 million intended beneficiaries (Greenberg, 2010: 4).
Within land reform circles, two further issues have dominated debates: the quality of
support provided (particularly by the state) to land reform beneficiaries, and the
dynamics of groups (often very large) that acquire land as a collective. This applies
equally to both the restitution and redistribution sub-programmes, especially in the
early years when redistribution projects tended to involve large numbers of families.
Various studies have, over the years, revealed that most land reform beneficiaries, or
groups, are effectively left to fend for themselves once they have acquired land, and
few receive much in the way of training, credit or extension services from either state
or private service providers (Jacobs, 2003; Hall, 2007; Lahiff et al., 2008; Aliber et
al., 2010). This can largely be attributed to poor planning and ineffectiveness among
state agencies such as the national Department of Rural Development and Land
Reform (formally the Department of Land Affairs) and provincial departments of
agriculture, as well the inability of most beneficiaries to afford the private support
services widely used by large-scale commercial farmers. This lack of post-settlement
support is greatly compounded by the imposition by the state agencies of poorly
designed or inappropriate farm plans (also referred to as business plans) that
encourage production of high-value commodities for the market, regardless of the
financial or technical resources of the resettled farmers concerned, and strongly
discourage either the subdivision of land into family plots or the production of staple
foods for direct consumption (Lahiff, 2007: 1590; van den Brink et al., 2006: 45).
While beneficiaries of land reform can acquire land by various routes, in most cases
they end up acquiring substantial properties (upwards of 100 hectares) as part of a
collective ownership group. This is due to a number of factors, including the large
average size of commercial farm properties in South Africa, the need to combine
resources across many households in order to buy land (in the case of the grant-
based redistribution programme) and the generally large size of communities
claiming land (under the restitution programme). This is greatly exacerbated,
however, by the resistance on the part of the state to any subdivision of existing
commercial farm units. This has led to a preponderance of large and often unwieldy
and factious groups attempting to manage farms and allocate benefits as a
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collective, often with disastrous results (Mayson, 2003; Hall, 2007: 15). For reasons
related to the size of claimant communities, and the size (and quality) of land under
claim, joint ventures have largely (but not exclusively) been associated with restitution
claims, rather than the wider redistribution programme. The cases examined here all
arise as part of the restitution programme.
In terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994, individuals or communities
that have been deprived of property rights under racially-based laws or policies since
1913 can claim restitution for such loss. All restitution claims are against the state
(rather than against past or present landowners) and can be settled by either cash
compensation, restoration of the land in question or other appropriate remedies,
depending on circumstances. Up to the end of 1998, when the lodgement process
came to an end, approximately 80,000 claims were lodged, by both individuals
(typically on behalf of their ancestors) and communities. The majority of these claims
have since been settled by cash compensation, with no return of land, but a sizable
minority have been settled by restoration of the land claimed. Typically this has been
less-developed rural land, including large areas in the semi-arid north-west of the
country and in areas such as the Kruger National Park, and claimants have often
been restricted in what they can do with the land. 
The highest concentration of claims on agricultural land has been in the north-east of
the country. Derman et al. (2010: 309) argue that a range of factors are contributing
to the pressure for return of ancestral land in this particular area: the relatively recent
date of dispossession (i.e. after the 1913 cut-off); the continued existence of
claimant groups as distinct communities living in close proximity to the claimed lands;
a history of contestation of dispossession, stretching up to the present day; the
continued involvement of many communities in agriculture; and the fact that the land
under claim continues to be used for agriculture.
The claimants in this area are generally large community (or tribal) groups, which
historically held the land collectively under traditional laws and customs, and claims
typically encompass numerous contemporary agricultural holdings. With the growth
in population over time, claimant groups may consist of hundreds or even thousands
of individuals. Under the law, land is restored to the community as a whole (generally
understood as the descendants of those originally dispossessed), without
subdivision, generally resulting in large groups holding large properties, generally
with an assumption (on the part of both claimants and government) that the land will
be managed as a single entity on behalf of the entire community.
The internal organisation and dynamics of these large land-holding groups have
been particularly problematic. In terms of land reform policy, claimant groups must
constitute themselves as a ‘legal entity’, which in most cases is either a legal trust or a
communal property association (CPA), a new form of institution specifically allowed
for under legislation. Various studies have found that few if any such institutions are
performing as envisaged by the law – in terms of management of assets, distribution
of benefits or democratic process – and many have ceased to function altogether
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(CSIR, 2005; CASE, 2006). The question of how a large heterogeneous community
can effectively manage operations as complex as large commercial farms is therefore
fundamental to the land restitution process in South Africa and effectively remains
unanswered in theory or practice.
Early experience with restitution revealed that communities faced a range of
challenges in terms of agricultural production and the distribution of benefits to
group members, including lack of working capital, lack of expertise in the areas of
production and marketing, abuses of power by local elites, and internal conflicts
(Hall, 2007). Although considerable financial support was provided by the state, this
was not generally accompanied by the long-term technical support that new owners
required. These problems were particularly acute in areas of high-value (and
technically sophisticated) production, such as dairying and sub-tropical fruit and
nuts. The high prices paid for such land, coupled with the widespread perception of
a collapse in production (actual or anticipated), have given rise to anger among
intended beneficiaries and ongoing criticism of the state agencies involved, not least
from politically conservative landowners and the wider business sector.
This led the national Department of Land Affairs (later the Department of Rural
Development and Land Reform) and the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights
to explore ways in which necessary skills and resources could be made available to
claimant groups and agricultural production maintained. In Limpopo, the model that
was favoured by state agencies from about 2001 has been strategic partnership,
whereby claimant communities enter into joint ventures with existing firms to operate
farms more or less along the lines established prior to transfer of ownership. Derman
et al. (2010: 310) summarise the factors leading to the implementation of the
strategic partnership model in Limpopo as follows:
An economic imperative to maintain the productivity of commercial farms and
minimize the impact on employment and the local export economy; a
developmental imperative to ensure long-term benefits to claimants, over and
above the symbolic value of the return of the land or the limited benefits perceived
to flow from alternative land uses (e.g., ‘subsistence’ agriculture); a political
imperative to preserve the image of the government — in the eyes of political
opponents, potential investors, and international commentators — as competent,
dependable in fulfilling its promises, and responsible in the use of state resources.
Since 2005, strategic partnerships have become the norm in high-value restitution
cases, and are concentrated in the sub-tropical zones of Limpopo and Mpumalanga
provinces. This can be attributed to the higher quality of the transferred land,
compared to land claims in other parts of the country, the technical and financial
challenges faced by large claimant communities in operating these farms and,
perhaps most importantly, growing pressure on communities from state agencies to
include commercial partners in order to avoid a repetition of the well-publicised
collapse of a number of earlier restitution projects. While many of these partnerships
are still at an early stage, evidence is emerging that many are facing difficulties in
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Figure 2. Key elements of a typical strategic partnership/joint venture (dotted
lines indicate potential relationship) 
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establishing themselves and a number have already collapsed. The strategic
partnership model has evolved gradually since it was first proposed, with some
variation between districts, but the broad concept continues to centre on a long-term
commercial partnership between a community and a commercial operator. Separate
partnerships are generally created for each community, although this is complicated
somewhat by the fact that in Levubu, for example, multiple communities are in
partnership with the same commercial operators (albeit in separate legal entities),
while at Moletele a single community has entered into partnerships with multiple
commercial operators. 
Under the strategic partnership model, ownership of land is vested in the claimants,
organised in a legal trust or a CPA. Once initial agreement has been reached
between all the parties, formal title to the land is transferred directly from the existing
landowner to the community with the state paying the owner the agreed purchase
prices. The land transfers and the provision of additional state grants are specified in
a settlement agreement signed between the claimant communities and the state.
Each claimant community and its strategic partner (or partners) are then required to
form an operating company, in which farm workers may also be given a small share
through a specially created farm workers’ trust (although this had generally not
occurred in practice – see below). Specific responsibilities and rights regarding the
company and its operations are supposed to be spelled out in a series of
documents, typically including a shareholders’ agreement, a lease agreement and, in
some cases, a management agreement between the parties although, as argued
below, these agreements are often lacking in specific detail. The key elements of
such a strategic partnership are illustrated in Figure 2.
Profits made by the joint venture are expected to be paid as dividends to
shareholders according to their shares, or reinvested in the operating company.
Although the operating company is jointly owned, day-to-day management of the
farms is generally in the hands of the commercial partner who, in terms of the
shareholders’ and management agreements, has control of financial and operational
matters. Depending on the exact nature of the agreement, the commercial partner
may charge the operating company a fee for management services, to cover salaries
of senior staff and other costs. Since the restitution programme does not pay for
movable property, such as tractors, trucks, packing machinery, or pumps, the
transferred farms typically do not possess the equipment required for production.
Vehicles and other equipment, therefore, have to be obtained by the new company,
either through leasing arrangements or purchase.
Under the strategic partnership model, claimant communities are expected to benefit
in a number of ways. Because of the relatively high value of capital assets it
contributes to the new company, the community is entitled to a cash rental from the
operating company, levied as a direct cost on the joint venture. In addition, as
shareholders, the community may receive a share of any profit made by the operating
company, typically in the order of 50%. In addition, communities may benefit from
preferential employment opportunities in the enterprise and a range of training
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opportunities for both employees and members of the wider community. Preferential
procurement of goods and services from companies based within the community
may also feature, along with support for new business ventures, although this is
generally not specified in the formal agreements between the parties. In a move to
protect the long-term interests of the communities, settlement agreements specify
that communities may neither sell, mortgage, nor otherwise put their land at risk.
While this may shield communities from risks, and protect land rights over the long-
term, it has obvious implications for communities (or the new joint ventures) wishing
to raise finance through the use of land as collateral.
For the commercial partners, these arrangements also offer a range of potential
benefits, at least in theory. Early on, it appeared that the prospect of a management
fee – based on turnover rather than profit – was a major attraction (Derman et al.,
2010: 315). As the nature of commercial partnerships has changed over time,
however, the prospect of a management salary may be more important, especially for
smaller partners, some of whom are effectively individual entrepreneurs working on
contract (see below). A second potential benefit is a share of profit but, as will be
shown, the need for considerable up-front investment and the failure of most
projects to produce any profits in the early years make this a faint prospect,
especially in the short term. Further benefits may lie in the control of upstream and
downstream activities related to farm production, such as the provision of fuel,
machinery or nursery stock, or the processing and marketing of produce, especially if
these activities are not shared with the community partners; this is the area about
which communities and other informants tend to be least informed, or unwilling to
share information.
The broad elements of this rather complex and experimental model may be usefully
summarised using the four-part schema developed by Vermeulen and Cotula (2010)
to assess value-sharing in business models involving smallholders as partners, as
shown in the following table. Note that the description of the joint venture model
used is based on official and project-level documents: in practice, the model differs
in many ways, as discussed below. 
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South African joint ventures
Community owns all land and a
share of the business; may or
may not own a share of
processing facilities.
Community has equal
representation at board level, but
day-to-day decision making rests
exclusively with the strategic
partner; responsibility for
overcoming asymmetries
effectively lies with the strategic
partner.
Direct financial risk lies largely with
the strategic partner and with the
state as providers of grants.
Community is exposed to
opportunity costs in terms of time,
land use and use of grants.
Collapse of an enterprise likely to
leave communities with degraded
assets and internal tensions.
State stands to lose financial
investment and reputation if
projects fail. Workers at risk of job
losses or replacement with
community members.
On paper, communities are well
provided for, in terms of land
rentals, a share of profits and
training opportunities. Strategic
partners would benefit from share
of profits, management fees and
exclusive control of upstream and
downstream opportunities. 
Comment
Control of land effectively
ceded to the strategic
partner for duration of the
agreement; control of
business likely to be
determined more by voice
(below) than by nominal
ownership.
Board of directors is too
high-level and unlikely to
be involved in most
operational decisions;
much depends on trainee
managers from the
community being able
and willing to influence
decisions, and on ability





of working capital led to
early shifting of risk from
strategic partners to the
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3.  Levubu case study
The Levubu River is a tributary of the Limpopo, and the Levubu valley is situated in the
extreme north-eastern corner of South Africa, east of the town of Makhado (formerly
Louis Trichardt), see Figure 3. Before 1898 the military strength of local tribes and
the presence of malaria meant the area was not occupied by white settlers who only
arrived in significant numbers from the 1920s (Harries, 1989). The colonial
government of the time established an irrigation scheme for poor white farmers in the
1930s, which only became fully operational with the construction of the Albasini dam
in the 1950s. The valley soon emerged as a centre of sub-tropical agriculture, based
on citrus, bananas, mangos, guavas and avocados and, more recently, litchis and
macadamia nuts, supplying both national and international markets. Temperatures
range from an average high of 21°C in June and July to 28°C in January, and an
average low of 10°C in June up to 18°C in February. Average precipitation is 561mm
per annum, with over half of this falling in the period December-February. Frost is an
occasional problem.1
Under Apartheid, the area formed part of ‘white’ South Africa, and land ownership
was reserved for white people. The African population of the area – speaking mainly
Venda and Shangaan (or Tsonga) – was gradually removed from the best agricultural
land and surrounding hillsides. Sizable numbers were incorporated into the white-
controlled agricultural economy, mainly as labour tenants and wage labourers,
through a variety of repressive measures (Lahiff, 2000; Fraser, 2007).
Virtually the entire irrigated area in the valley – in excess of 400 individual properties
– has been claimed under the Restitution of Land Rights Act. This has given rise to a
prolonged – and vigorously contested – process of legal investigation and
verification of claims, and the gradual transfer of properties from white owners to
black claimants.2 The first two phases of settlement (in 2004-2008) saw the transfer
of approximately 5,382 hectares of land, in 63 parcels, to seven claimant
communities, at a total purchase price of 219 million South African Rand (ZAR)
(equivalent to approximately USD 31.7 million).3 The state, through the Department
of Land Affairs, allocated an additional ZAR 5 million (USD 724,000) to claimant
communities in the form of Settlement Planning Grants and Restitution Discretionary
Grants,4 for farm planning and land development, and substantial additional grants
for development purposes were later provided (see below). The choice of properties
for transfer in the early phases of resettlement was effectively determined by the
existing landowners, some of whom accepted the offers made by the state while
1. Climate statistics from Weather Report.Com:
http://www.weatherreports.com/South_Africa/Levubu/averages.html?n=2
2. ‘Levubu: the litmus test for land reform’. Farmer’s Weekly (South Africa), 4th March 2005, pp.34-35. Article by
S. Hofstatter.
3. Exchange rate used throughout this report (as of 12 November 2010): USD 1 = ZAR 6.91.
4. Also referred to as Section 42C grants.




















































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3. Levubu claims (overall situation at the time of writing)
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others rejected them (with many expressing outright opposition to the entire
restitution process). To date, the state has not used its powers of expropriation to
seize land from uncooperative owners, either at Levubu or at Moletele (below).
This section provides an overview of the seven community claims at Levubu, with a
more detailed examination of the Ravele joint venture.
It is not known exactly how many workers were employed on the farms immediately
before or after the transfer of ownership, but estimates for Levubu as a whole put the
figure for workers employed either directly on the farms or in the upstream and
downstream businesses linked to them in the area of 10,000 (Lahiff et al., 2006). 
The restitution claimants at Levubu are all defined as communities, in terms of the
Restitution Act, mainly on the basis that land was originally held as a community,
under a central authority (i.e. a tribal chief), and that land rights were therefore based
on membership of this community rather than on western concepts of individual title.
These communities all define themselves in terms of their tribal identities – Ravele,
Tshakhuma, Ratombo, Shigalo, Tshivazwaulu, Masakona and Tshitwani – and
hereditary tribal chiefs (‘traditional leaders’ in South African parlance) feature
prominently in the leadership of these communities. Nonetheless, they are all formally
established as either CPAs5 or legal trusts. The number of households involved
ranges from 57 in the case of Tshivazwaulu community to 324 in the case of Ravele
(see Table 2).
5. For example, the Ravele CPA was formally constituted in terms of a written constitution signed on 13th March
2004.
6. Including land purchase (phases 1 and 2), Restitution Discretionary Grant, Settlement Planning Grant and
Section 42C grants.
Table 2. Land claimant communities at Levubu
Name of Size of land Number of Total value 
community restored (ha) households of claim
(Rand million)6
Ravele 344 324 52.5
Tshakhuma 861 144 65.5
Ratombo 1,330 52 44.2
Shigalo 715 120 45
Tshivazwaulu 651 57 4.5
Masakona 860 148 60.5
Tshitwani 621 78 36.9
Source: Commission on Restitution of Land Rights Section 42D Memorandum (no date); and Commission on
Restitution of Land Rights Section 42C Memorandum, dated 6th August 2007.
The farms in question are mainly planted with perennial fruit and nut orchards,
although sizable areas are used for annual crops such as cabbage, maize and sweet
potatoes. Not all land was in full production at the time of transfer, meaning that there
was scope for additional crop development. While most activity is centred on primary
production, a range of added value processes are also located in the Levubu valley
and some of these (but not all) have been transferred to claimants along with land.
These include packing facilities for bananas and citrus, factories for the production of
oils from macadamias and avocados, juice from citrus, litchis, guavas and mangos
and achar (pickle) from green mangos.
For the Ravele community, the total value of land transfers and other benefits to date has
been ZAR 52.5 million (USD 7.6 million), comprising a total land cost of ZAR 41 million
(USD 5.9 million), Development Assistance grant of ZAR 10.3 million (USD 1.5 million),
Settlement Planning Grants of ZAR 470,000 (USD 68,000) and Restitution
Discretionary Grants of ZAR 970,000 million (USD 140,000) (see Table 2). Both
Masakona and Tshakhuma exceeded this figure, whereas Tshivazwaulu was
considerably less, at ZAR 4.5 million (USD 650,000) in total.7 The Restitution
Discretionary Grants is based on the value of land transferred (25% of purchase
price), while the latter two are based on the number of households within the
respective communities: ZAR 1,440 (USD 208) per household of the Settlement
Planning Grant and ZAR 3,000 (USD 434) per household for the Restitution
Discretionary Grant.
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7. Source: Commission on Restitution of Land Rights, Section 42C Memorandum, dated 6th August 2007.
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As noted above, the push for strategic partnerships in Limpopo came originally from
the office of the Regional Land Claims Commissioner in Limpopo, working with the
Restitution Support branch of the provincial Department of Agriculture, but it has
been shaped by demand from communities themselves who have argued they must
not be saddled with elaborate enterprises that they are unable to manage effectively.
Pressure also came from existing owners of land, as well as politicians and local
providers of goods and services, to maintain the productivity and integrity of the local
economy.
The state agencies originally proposed that a single company, South African Farm
Management (SAFM), controlled by the Boyes Group, would become the strategic
partner for all the claims in the Levubu valley. SAFM was set up specifically to
engage in such partnerships by established (white) interests in the agricultural sector
and new black empowerment partners, and already enjoyed a close working
relationship with the provincial Department of Agriculture. This proposal was resisted
by at least some of the Levubu communities due to the lack of an element of choice
and the implication that all communities should work together. The Regional Land
Claims Commissioner subsequently selected a second company, Mavu
Management Services, formed by a number of white farmers from Levubu, with
individual black partners, as a second strategic partner for the Levubu claimants. By
June 2005, SAFM had been confirmed as the strategic partner for five of the seven
claimant communities at Levubu, and Mavu as the partner for the remaining two.
Formal agreements were not signed until late 2007, however, and the impact of
prolonged negotiations on productivity and the physical condition of the properties
has been a major source of contention. As will be shown below, all of these
partnerships collapsed within less than three years.
3.1  Ratombo and Shigalo farms
The Shigalo and Ratombo communities both formed partnerships with Mavu, in April
2006, and so share a common experience. For the white farmers that controlled
Mavu, this arrangement added considerable volume to their existing farming
operations at Levubu and held out the prospect of additional throughput for their
local processing plants. Produce from the Shigalo and Ratombo farms would be
marketed on domestic and international markets using channels largely controlled by
Mavu.
From the outset, the farms were reportedly in poor condition due to neglect by the
former owners, due in turn to delays in release of purchase payments by the state
leading to delays in transfer of ownership to the communities.8 According to
informants in Shigalo, Mavu spent a considerable amount on operating the farms
over the following year, including payment of wages and purchase of machinery and
other inputs, but much of this would have been recovered through the sale of farm
produce (all income going to Mavu at this time). Development grants that had been
8. Interview with members of Shigalo CPA, 16th August 2010.
promised by the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights to the proposed joint
ventures did not materialise at this time, however, and Mavu pulled out of the
arrangement in June 2007, before any formal agreement was signed. A similar story
was related by informants at Ratombo. On the departure of Mavu, the Shigalo CPA
reportedly paid Mavu an amount of ZAR 1.8 million (USD 260,000) for machinery
and other assets that Mavu had purchased for the farms. On the Ratombo farms,
informants reported that Mavu was involved only for the period June to September
2007 and, when it withdrew, the community used part of its grant funding to buy the
equipment from the company. Throughout this period, Mavu appears to have carried
out basic maintenance on the farms and met other costs out of crop revenues, but no
financial benefit accrued to the communities in the form of either rent or profit share.
With the departure of Mavu, South African Farm Management, which was then active
on the neighbouring farms (see below), came into the farms in a caretaker capacity,
by agreement with the provincial Department of Agriculture, but again without any
formal agreement with the communities of Shigalo or Ratombo. As before, revenues
from the farms went directly to the intended strategic partners and no benefits
flowed to the communities during this phase.
In December 2007, however, the Shigalo and Ratombo communities signed 15-year
lease and strategic partnership agreements with a new strategic partner, Umlimi
Holdings, in preference to SAFM. Umlimi described itself as an integrated agricultural
group,9 and is a subsidiary of Peu Group (Pty) Ltd. Peu is a black-owned and
predominantly black-managed investment holding company heavily involved in Black
Economic Empowerment deals across mainly financial services, information and
communication technologies, supply chain, fleet lease and automotive sectors.10 The
management structure, however (and subsequent events), suggests that Umlimi is
effectively an arm of Free State Maize, a large white-controlled agro-processing
company. Umlimi managed the farms remotely from its offices in Johannesburg and
Cape Town, although a locally-based manager was employed for some time. On
signature of formal agreements with Umlimi, in December 2007, state grants worth in
excess of ZAR 16 million (USD 2.3 million) were reportedly transferred to the new
operating companies (joint ventures), part of which was used to purchase equipment
from Mavu.11 As with most aspects of the restitution process at Levubu, however, there
is considerable debate and confusion about the total value of grants handed over to the
communities or their partners, and when, and what exactly happened to the money.
Informants at Shigalo reported that, under Umlimi, harvests in the first year of
operation (2008-09) were well below optimal, due largely to a lack of maintenance
and necessary investment.12 At Ratombo, Umlimi was reported to have been
harvesting throughout the year 2008 and, while it paid for current expenses such as
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9. See http://www.umlimi.co.za/index.html
10. See http://www.peugroup.co.za/overview.htm
11. Interview with members of Shigalo CPA, 16th August 2010; interview with CRLR officials, Polokwane, 
17th June 2010.
12. Interview with members of Shigalo CPA, 16th August 2010.
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wages and agricultural inputs, it did not fund any new planting or other long-term
investments.13 During this time, community members complained, all farm revenues
and grant income from the state was effectively under the exclusive control of Umlimi,
with little or no involvement by community representatives in decision making and no
reporting of financial affairs. 
By late 2009, the Shigalo and Ratombo farms managed by Umlimi were in serious
financial trouble. Umlimi representatives resigned from the boards of the two joint
venture companies and were replaced with people (reportedly from Free State
Maize) previously unknown to the communities; within a short time both operating
companies were in provisional liquidation.14 In the case of Shigalo, this was forced
by a relatively minor creditor which was owed just ZAR 220,000 (USD 32,000) for
irrigation equipment. Total debts for the company, however, were reported to be in
the order of ZAR 17 million (USD 2.5 million), although this could not be verified; over
ZAR 1 million (USD 145,000) was owed to a fertilizer supplier and ZAR 1.2 million
(USD 174,000) owed to the community (i.e. CPA) in rent.15 Ratombo was reportedly
faced with similar levels of debts. All staff on the Umlimi-run operations (in excess of
400 at Shigalo alone) were laid off in early 2010 and less than half of them were
13. Interview with members of Ratombo CPA, 15th June 2010.
14. Interview with members of Ratombo CPA, 18th June 2010. It would appear that Free State Maize was the
effective power behind Umlimi, and reportedly replaced the directors without consultation with the community.
15. One community representative estimated that Umlimi had invested up to ZAR 4 million (USD 580,000) in the
Shigalo joint venture, although at the time of signing the agreement mention was made of credit facilities of up to
ZAR 200 million (USD 28.9 million). It was also mentioned that ZAR 2.3 million (USD 332,000) in grants was used
for implements, and that the total value of grants paid amounted to ZAR 9 million (USD 1.3 million).
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subsequently re-hired on a temporary basis. The precise status of the joint venture
operations was not clear at the time of fieldwork (August 2010), but had effectively
collapsed. Umlimi was attempting to negotiate the sale of its share in the joint
operating company to the Shigalo community for ZAR 5.5 million (USD 796,000),
money that the community had no hope of raising. By October 2010, Shigalo was
reportedly attempting to form a new operating company – Shigalo Farm
Management – in order to run its farms without a strategic partner.16
The ongoing difficulties experienced by Shigalo and Ratombo communities and the
failure of financial benefits to materialise over a five-year period have contributed to
growing tensions within these communities. At Ratombo, this had led to an effective
split in the community, with one faction allied to the official CPA committee (and to
the Ratombo royal family) and the other opposed to it. In 2009 the Ratombo
community had a further three farms restored to them and small groups of individuals
within the community occupied the farms in order to prevent them falling under the
control of the CPA committee or becoming part of the joint venture with Umlimi.
These farms are now being worked by a handful of community members, using their
own very limited resources, at a very basic level. Sales of bananas and some
vegetables are providing some limited cash flow but not sufficient to carry out
necessary maintenance on the irrigation infrastructure, replant aged banana plants or
hire the labour necessary for weeding.17 This subgroup was advocating for the
outstanding development grants (estimated at ZAR 3.5 million, approximately 
USD 506,000) to be paid directly to them, for use on the farm, but this had not yet
been agreed with the Regional Land Claims Commissioner, reportedly on the basis
that the subgroup did not have the support of the official CPA committee and that
complete financial reports on the joint venture company had not been produced.
While this group is working hard to make a success of the farm, their experience
highlights the importance of external sources of finance (and expertise), whether
from state or commercial partners, to commercial farming operations at Levubu. 
Other problems reported by community representatives at Shigalo and Ratombo
were that produce from the two operations was also reportedly mixed together by
Umlimi management, and no separate accounts were kept; as a result, there is
ongoing dispute between the two communities over revenues due to them and
around ownership of shared assets such as tractors. 
At the time of writing, these farms were operating only at a very basic level, and no
strategic partnerships or other joint ventures were actually in operation.
16. Interview with members of Shigalo CPA, 23rd October 2010.
17. Interview with farmers at Meyer farm (Ratombo), 18th June and 18th August 2010.
3. Levubu case study 23
3.2  Partnerships with SAFM
South African Farm Management (SAFM) was appointed by the Limpopo
Department of Agriculture in June 2005 to manage the farms owned by the Ravele,
Tshakhuma, Masakona, Tshitwani and Tshivazwaulu communities until formal
agreements could be signed with the five communities. SAFM, like Mavu, was largely
engaged in agricultural production but, through its links to the Boyes group, was also
integrated into downstream processing and marketing operations, both for the
domestic (South African) and international markets. 
At the outset, this partnership involved a total of 3,334 hectares of land, in 45
portions, with a total purchase price of ZAR 148.6 million (USD 21.5 million). By the
time the joint venture agreement with SAFM was finally agreed, in December 2007,
the total land area had risen as a result of further land transfers, by approximately
200ha, bringing the total value of land to ZAR 182 million (USD 26.3 million).18 A
further ZAR 45.5 million (USD 6.6 million) was approved for these communities in
the form of Development Assistance Grants, to be paid directly to the operating
companies. This was calculated at 25% of the total land purchase price, the
maximum grant amount allowed under the law. Controversy persists, however,
around exactly how much of the development grant was actually paid over by the
state and exactly how it was used. 
Under the joint venture agreement, each operating company was to be controlled by
a board of directors, consisting of five community representatives, five
representatives of SAFM and a non-voting director (a state official) appointed by the
Limpopo Department of Agriculture. For the first three years of the agreement, the
chairperson of the board would be a representative of the strategic partner, and
enjoy a casting vote.19
Similar business arrangements were made for all five communities involved with
SAFM. Indeed, all the newly-created joint ventures were managed by the same
management team, based at the same office, on Appelfontein farm, although the five
boards of directors met separately and communities were not generally involved in
each other’s business. In the case of Ravele, for example, the CPA acquired 52% of
the shares20 in the operating company (Imperial Crown Trading 43 Pty Ltd,
established in 2005) through a Shareholders’ Agreement signed on 8th December
2007, designed to last for a period of 10 years, after which the CPA would have the
option to buy out the strategic partner. On the same date, an Agreement of Lease
18. Source: Commission on Restitution of Land Rights, Section 42C Memorandum dated 6/08/2007. For Ravele,
the total value of grants was ZAR 11.7 million (USD 1.7 million), which included all SPG, RDG and Section 42C
(development) grants; these were approved by the Chief Commissioner on 6th August 2007 and approved for
transfer to the joint venture (following signing of the shareholders’ agreement) on 21st December 2007
(Commission on Restitution of Land Rights, Transfer of Funds Agreement, Ravele Community, dated 21 December
2007).
19. Shareholders Agreement Amongst South African Farm Management (Proprietary) Limited and Ravele
Communal Property Association (signed 8th December 2007).
20. The shareholders’ agreement stipulated that 2% of shareholding, to be taken from the CPA share, would be
transferred to workers’ trust once this was established, but this never happened.
was signed between Ravele CPA and the operating company, again for a period of
10 years. Rent was calculated at 1.25% of the purchase value of land per annum,
payable monthly.21
In December 2007, the state agreed to transfer large grants that were owed to the
communities for development and related purposes. For the communities working
with SAFM, this amounted to approximately ZAR 50 million (USD 7.2 million), of
which approximately ZAR 45.6 million (USD 6.6 million) was transferred directly to
the operating companies.22
For Ravele alone, the grants were worth ZAR 11.7 million (USD 1.7 million). The
Transfer of Funds Agreement signed by the Commission on Restitution of Land
Rights and the Limpopo Department of Agriculture23 makes clear that these grants
would be paid to the joint venture (i.e. the operating company), and not to the
community:
The Commission will transfer a total amount of R11,703,560 in two equal tranches
of R5,851,780 in four month intervals into the Operating Company bank account
for purposes of operating the properties restored to the [Ravele] CPA as outlined in
the business plan. (Clause 1)
Moreover, the same agreement also makes clear that the state would remain in a
position to control the use of these funds, raising questions as to how effectively it
subsequently carried out this function:
Prior to transfer of the funds mentioned (…) the Operating Company and the CPA
shall ensure that the Limpopo Department of Agriculture is a co-signatory to the
above mentioned bank account. This means that the money transferred to the
Operating Company account (…) shall not be withdrawn without the signature of a
designated official of the Limpopo Department of Agriculture. (Clause 2)
Major financial difficulties became apparent within the Ravele-SAFM joint venture
from the outset; although less information was forthcoming, it would appear that
Tshakhuma, Masakona, Tshitwani and Tshivazwaulu communities had a similar
experience in terms of limited financial information, few if any benefits to the
communities and rapid collapse of the partnerships. At the first-ever meeting of the
board of directors of the new (jointly owned) operating company, in February 2008,
the financial report of the Company was not ratified, apparently as a result of what
community leaders described as ‘serious discrepancies’ related to accumulating
losses, non-availability of audited financial statements for the previous two years and
lack of clarity around the amount of money to be invested by SAFM in terms of the
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21. Agreement of Lease between Ravele Community Property Association and Imperial Crown Trading 34
(Proprietary) Limited.
22. There is, however, some dispute around whether the total amount was actually transferred by the state
agencies involved.
23. Transfer of Funds Agreement between Department of Land Affairs and Limpopo Department of Agriculture
and Imperial Crown Trading 43 PTY (Ltd). Signed 13th December 2007. Copy in Ravele CPA files.
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Shareholders’ Agreement.24 At a follow-up meeting in May 2008, the community
representatives learned that the provincial Department of Agriculture Government
had already transferred ZAR 5.8 million (USD 840,000) worth of development
grants directly to the operating company, seemingly without the knowledge of the
community. Community leaders were under the impression that such development
grants would be transferred to the company only when they were satisfied with the
financial position and had obtained clarification from SAFM regarding the extent of
its liabilities. According to leaders of the Ravele community, SAFM was subsequently
unable to account for how the grant money was spent and, in September 2008, the
CPA received a letter from SAFM (indirectly, via the Department of Agriculture)
announcing that it was withdrawing from the strategic partnership. It was only at that
point that the community learned the extent of the bank overdraft incurred by the
operating company, and that a cession had been given on the farm’s crops. The
following month, the bank froze the company’s account, creating great difficulties for
the farming operations. 
For the nine months or so that SAFM was operating in a formal partnership with the
five communities, there does appear to have been some effort made to train and
mentor management candidates from the communities and more expenditure on
maintenance and production inputs. According to the Ravele farm manager, SAFM
took over the farms in reasonably good order, but then focused their attention on
harvesting and selling the produce, and did not invest significantly in replanting, pest-
control (spraying) or irrigating. As a result, productivity fell far below the industry
standard. Where SAFM made investments, including the rental paid to the CPA, this
was largely on the basis of capital borrowed from ABSA Bank, for which the
community found itself ultimately liable.25 None of this income was passed on to
community members. 
Losses on all the SAFM-controlled farms were considerable. For the year ending
28th Feb 2007 (the first full financial year for which SAFM was in sole charge of
operations), the Ravele-owned farms made a net loss of ZAR 2.306 million 
(USD 334,000), reporting sales of ZAR 0.567 million (USD 82,000) – almost
entirely from bananas – against expenditure of ZAR 2.874 million (USD 416,000).
No sales at all were recorded for the very substantial citrus and macadamia orchards.
For the period March 2007 to September 2007, losses of ZAR 1.706 million 
(USD 247,000) were incurred, bringing the accumulated debts of the company to
just over ZAR 4 million (USD 580,000).26
Following its withdrawal from Levubu, SAFM itself went into liquidation. This left the
communities as sole owners of the operating companies and, as such, responsible
for the accumulated debts. It is significant that, during its time in Levubu, SAFM
borrowed funds not in its own name but in the name of the joint venture companies.
24. Interview with members of Ravele CPA, 15th August 2010.
25. Interview with Ravele farm manager and CPA members, 18th August 2010.
26. Source: Income Statement included as part of the Shareholders Agreement, signed 8th Dec 2007. Total sales
for year March 2007-Feb 2008 were ZAR 3.555 million (USD 515,000) (interview with BR).
Following the collapse of the joint ventures, the Commission on Restitution of Land
Rights issued a press statement which referred to its ‘difficulties in obtaining the
audited financial statements from SAFM as the lead partner in the strategic
partnerships’.27 The Commission was clearly under the impression that SAFM was
incurring the debts in its own name:
A meeting was held with the CLCC, ABSA and SAFM a few months ago wherein
ABSA indicated that it is not in a position to continue giving SAFM bridging
finance if the Commission does not avail grant funding. While operating the farms,
SAFM had to use some of the operating finance from ABSA to do capital
improvements on the restored farms in order to keep the farms functional pending
approval of grant funding from the Commission. This has led to a situation where
ABSA decided to put on hold further funding to SAFM. It is therefore crucial that
the requested grant funding be approved otherwise the farms will collapse.28
Thus, not only did the communities lose all or most of their development grants as a
result of the collapse of the joint ventures, but they were left with very substantial
debts to the banks and other creditors. Although the operating companies could, in
principle, be liquidated, and the debts written-off, this did not appear to be an option
for the communities concerned. Possible explanations for this are that the
communities feared that, as owners of the land, they could still be pursued by
creditors (i.e. they could not hide) or, more likely, that any new company arising from
within the same community would be denied credit and other services (i.e. be black-
listed) by existing and potential creditors. This left the communities with little option
but to work off their debts or, in some cases, to be denied credit.
As in many other respects, the precise role played by the provincial Department of
Agriculture and the office of the Regional Land Claims Commissioner during this
phase remains unclear but, despite close contact with the strategic partner (often in
the absence of community representatives), and having a director sitting on the
board of every joint venture company, it appears that the state institutions were not
well informed regarding the details of the company and did not intervene in a timely
manner to address the mounting financial problems. Indeed, community
representatives reported that the state-appointed directors ‘defended SAFM’29
against all criticisms raised by the community.
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27. Commission on Restitution of Land Rights 2008, South African Farm Management partnership with restitution
beneficiaries under review. Press statement, 20 November 2008.
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2008/08112110151002.htm
28. Commission on Restitution of Land Rights, Section 42C Memorandum, September 2007.
29. Interview with members of Ravele CPA, 17th August 2010.
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3.3  Post-SAFM: the case of Ravele
On the exit of SAFM, the farming enterprises owned by the communities of Ravele,
Masakona, Tshitwani, Tshivazwaulu and Tshakhuma were left in varying states of
disarray.30 Of these, the Ravele farms appear to be making the most progress
towards a viable commercial operation without a major strategic partner, and are
examined here in more detail.
Ravele was left in severe financial difficulties following the collapse of SAFM. In
October 2008, the first month in which it traded on its own, the operating company
faced debts of over ZAR 5 million (USD 724,000): ZAR 3.1 million (USD 447,000)
owed to ABSA bank, ZAR 2.1 million (USD 304,000) to various suppliers and 
ZAR 170,000 (USD 25,000) to the CPA in rental. It was particularly frustrating for
the community that, despite the operating company absorbing so much of its grants,
30. Interview with members of Masakona CPA, 17th June 2010.












and incurring such large debts for which it was now responsible, much of the
machinery on the farms was said to be the exclusive property of the strategic partner,
and in August 2010 the community was in the process of negotiating for the
purchase of tractors and other machines (valued at ZAR 1.2 million, or
USD 174,000) from the liquidators of SAFM.31
In March 2009 the operating company on the Ravele farms – Imperial Crown Trading
43 (Pty) Ltd, now effectively owned entirely by the CPA – was put under provisional
judicial management (first stage of liquidation) but was allowed to continue trading
under supervision.
One of the strategies used by SAFM was to hire a locally-based agricultural
specialist to manage a number of the farms under its control. The general manager
had prior experience of managing farms on behalf of other private owners at Levubu,
and worked as a consultant to others, particularly in the macadamia sector. Since the
withdrawal (and bankruptcy) of SAFM, this manager has continued to work with
some of the communities, particularly with Ravele and Masakona, where a new form
of partnership is emerging: not involving a large corporation from ‘outside’, but with
an individual entrepreneur whose principal input is his expertise, with no promise of
capital investment.
A key role for the general manager has been negotiation with creditors, particularly
with the banks. In May 2010, agreement was reached that both Ravele and
Masakona would each pay ABSA bank ZAR 865,000 (USD 125,000) over a five-
year period (described as a ‘compromise arrangement’ as some of the debt was
wiped out), in order to clear the loan outstanding from the SAFM period. This
included an agreement that the bank would recoup substantial payments owed to
the farm by FruitOne (Pty) Ltd, a marketing company linked to the Boyes Group (the
ultimate owners of SAFM). The collapse of SAFM featured at the time in South
Africa’s Sunday Times: ‘Now SAFM has gone into liquidation, allegedly owing more
than R100-million. The future of the fruit farms that were claimed by the Masakona
community and others in the Levubu Valley hangs in the balance.’ Engelina
Ramulondo, a spokesperson for the Masakona community, told the newspaper they
had been shocked to discover that SAFM had allegedly borrowed ZAR 5 million
(USD 724,000) for them from ABSA: ‘We were not aware that SAFM had secured a
loan on our behalf and now we're sitting with a debt we don't know how to settle’.32
This agreement removed the threat of liquidation and meant that the company could
trade normally.
By May 2010, total outstanding debts at Ravele had been reduced to ZAR 0.86 million
(USD 124,000) owed to ABSA and a further ZAR 0.47 million (USD 68,000) owed
to other creditors; plus a positive balance of ZAR 33,000 (USD 5,000) in a new
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32. Bongani Mthethwa, ‘Bungle has ruined new black farmers’. Times Live website, 01 March 2009. 
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bank account (with Standard Bank). By May 2010, the total outstanding debt of the
operating company to the CPA (including outstanding rental and loans from the CPA
account) stood at ZAR 2.3 million (USD 333,000).
Around this time, Ravele community, with the help of their farm manager, began
approaching various funders for support, while also restructuring its commercial
relationships with the banks, suppliers and marketing outlets. To assist in this
process, a business plan was drawn up, detailing current and projected activities,
cash-flow, and investment needs. A decision was taken (clearly based on recent
experience) not to involve new shareholders in joint ventures but to seek investment
from more conventional arms-length financiers. In particular, an approach was being
prepared to the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), a state-owned national
development finance institution that provides financing to entrepreneurs and
businesses engaged in competitive industries. Although operating on fully
commercial lines, IDC’s mission commits it to promoting job creation, economic
growth, socially and environmentally responsible enterprises as well as BEE, thus
making it a particularly suitable investment partner. Ravele has also submitted a
business plan to the provincial Department of Agriculture, hoping to access
additional grants for ZAR 1.9 million (USD 275,000).
During this turn-around phase, payment of rental to the community (which would
mean taking cash out of the business) has been suspended and distribution of other
benefits, as in a share of profits, is not even being considered, at least in the short
term. It should be noted however, that as the community is now the sole owner of the
business, as well as the owner of the land, payment of rental may no longer be
appropriate and is effectively interchangeable with profit (or loss). The key question,
however, remains: how will ordinary community members benefit, particularly if the
operating company is not making a profit, or is committed to long-term investments,
and therefore not in a position to distribute benefits?
Production at Ravele is now more focused on just three key crops – bananas,
avocados and macadamias – although this has not been without some tension
between the community and the general manager. Citrus, seen by many as a
prestige crop because of its export potential, is being phased out by the manager, on
the basis that the local environment is not ideal (compared to areas such as Letsitele
and Moletele to the south): excessive precipitation reportedly leads to high incidence
of black spot and requires excessive fungicidal spraying.33 Export-grade fruit is costly
to produce, due to the spraying requirements, and is vulnerable to a sudden drop in
prices or currency fluctuation, as recent experience has shown. Lower grade fruit
sold locally for juice still returns a profit due to much lower handling costs, and
involves little risk. According to the farm manager, the community reluctantly agreed
to a policy of no spraying and selling oranges locally for juicing, and now accept that
this is a more reliable strategy that still shows a profit and, most importantly, greatly
reduces pressure on scare financial resources.
33. Interview with Ravele farm manager and CPA members, 18th August 2010.
According to the farm manager, a judicious mix of avocados, macadamias and
bananas will ensure cash-flow and, over the next year or two should yield a modest
profit; and this strategic approach to production and marketing sets Ravele apart from
the other land claimant communities at Levubu.34 With avocados, Levubu can produce
earlier in the year than virtually anywhere else in the world and thus has a comparative
advantage on international markets, especially in Europe. In recent years, however,
local (South African) prices have been described as ‘excellent’, and more profitable
than exports, and so Ravele has concentrated on the domestic market. Macadamias –
which are almost entirely for export – are seen as a long term-investment because of
the time taken for trees to come to fruition, and somewhat risky due to fluctuations in
international prices and delays in receipt of final payments from the cracking plants.
Bananas yield a steady cash flow through almost the entire year, without any time lag,
and are seen by the Ravele farmers as critical to meeting day-to-day cash needs. Thus,
the farm is effectively running on the basis of current revenues, which covers wages,
production inputs and support services, but has also yielded sufficient capital to
replant 15ha of bananas. Machinery is still in short supply, and that which is available is
shared between all the Ravele and Masakona farms. This is seen by the farm manager
as seriously impeding production activities, especially at harvest time.
With the assistance of their professional farm manager, Ravele community has
instituted new arrangements for management of the farms, which includes an active
programme of mentoring and training, along with transfer of substantial responsibility
to community members and an active role for the CPA committee. Each individual
farm within the Ravele and Masakona clusters (14 in total) is run as a separate unit,
with its own manager, all of whom are black and most of whom are from the
respective communities. In addition, one pack-house manager is employed to
oversee the three pack-houses on the farms, as well as a production manager, a
workshop manager, two clerks (one per community) and one bookkeeper (the only
other white employee, apart from the general manager). The general manager
oversees weekly management meetings (one each for Ravele and Masakona), and a
range of training events both on and off the farm. All managers keep careful
production charts, and ‘scout’ for pests.
The general manager is not personally linked to any downstream processing or
marketing ventures, and so Ravele community is free to use whatever processing and
marketing channels are available through the market, for local, national and international
distribution of their produce. Limpopo province (and South Africa generally) possesses
highly developed and competitive marketing channels and, although control of
downstream industries can bring additional benefits, it also brings greater levels of risk
and puts additional pressure on both working capital and management expertise, both
of which are in short supply at Ravele at this stage. Extending control down the value
chain does not appear to be a priority. Ravele and Masakona communities, working with
this general manager, have very substantial capacity in primary production, albeit of
high-value produce, which they have yet to maximise; intervention down the value chain
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would tie up capital and expose them to unacceptable risks and areas where they lack
expertise; they thus make use of the channels used by most other (white) producers at
Levubu and in neighbouring districts who also focus primarily on primary production
(only some of whom have on-farm processing or other marketing ventures). Thus,
focusing on production does not put these communities at a major disadvantage, and
can probably still yield substantial benefits.
In June 2010, Ravele community was approached by Green Farms Nut Company,
located on neighbouring land, to enter into a joint venture that would engage in
dehusking, drying and storage of nuts for farmers in the area, but with Ravele as
‘preferred suppliers’ to the factory (i.e. receiving preferential access during peak
periods).35 Another innovation being pursued by Ravele is to apply for registration as
a Fair Trade farm, the first such in Levubu, and also for accreditation with
GLOBALG.A.P.36 Fair Trade status takes advantage of the relatively novel status of
Ravele as a community-owned enterprise in the high-value export sector, while
GLOBALG.A.P. has the potential to secure their profile as a premium brand.
Overall, the partnership between the Ravele communities and their professional farm
manager appears to be working well, as the farms have gone from substantial
operating losses under SAFM (reportedly in the order of ZAR 3 million per year, or
USD 434,000) to modest profit in their first full year of independent operation.37
Annual profits are projected to reach ZAR 5 million (USD 724,000) within three
years and the general manager predicts that just one of the Ravele farms –
Appelfontein – alone could soon achieve an annual turnover in excess of this. 
3.4  Ravele’s deal with its farm manager
The emerging relationship between Ravele and their professional farm manager is
central to the turn-around strategy outlined above, and provides important lessons
that may be applicable to other projects.
As mentioned, the manager is not a shareholder, but a professional manager
retained by the operating company (effectively by the Ravele community) to run its
farms. Nevertheless, with extensive agricultural and financial experience, he
exercises considerable influence as general manager.
Other farm managers in the district are generally remunerated through a mix of salary
and profit-related incentives, thereby giving them some stake in the success of the
business. The manager’s basic salary – which is shared between Ravele and
neighbouring Masakona38 – appears to be somewhat below the going rate and he is
35. Interview with members of Ravele CPA, 17th August 2010.
36. GLOBALG.A.P. (formerly known as EUREPG.A.P) is a private-sector body that sets voluntary standards for
the certification of agricultural products around the globe (G.A.P. stands for Good Agricultural Practices).
37. Turnover for Ravele for the year ending February 2010 was ZAR 2.5 million (USD 362,000) and profit was
ZAR 409,000 (USD 59,000). The accumulated loss for the company at the end of July 2010 stood at 
ZAR 3.3 million (USD 478,000), most of which was owed to the Ravele CPA.
38. Originally, during the transition from SAFM, the manager's salary (and his time) was also shared by Tshitwani
and Tsivashaula, but this arrangement did not last long after the exit of SAFM.
not at this stage provided with the housing, health insurance and transportation
allowances that are the norm within the sector. The most likely explanation for this is
the dire financial condition of the farm, coupled with the need to contain the already
substantial differential between the general manager and other members of staff.39
Notably absent from the package is any profit-related incentive, which may relate to
the very risky nature of the business in its current form. However, another form of
incentive has been agreed upon: the manager rents one farm from the Ravele
community (at close to market rates), where he grows macadamias, avocados and
bananas, and says that this is what keeps him motivated.40
The absence of any share agreement with the farm manager leaves the community,
at least on paper, in a stronger position than it was with SAFM, but whether this
arrangement gives it all the resources it requires – especially in terms of capital and
marketing know-how – remains to be seen. Early indications are promising, however,
for reasons largely related to the well-developed and competitive nature of the South
African agricultural sector, which allows new entrants to avail of a wide range of
processing and marketing channels. It may well be that management expertise –
rather than investment partners – is the real key to success in this field.
3.5  Concluding comments: Levubu
The restitution process at Levubu has restored large areas of land to its original
owners, organised in seven tribal-based communities. The high-value activities
based on the land have, however, posed enormous challenges to the new owners,
who lack access to capital and technical expertise. Interventions by the state
agencies responsible for restitution and post-settlement support led to the
consolidation of holdings into large centralised units and the introduction of three
‘strategic partners’. Without exception, the communities’ experience of strategic
partnerships was negative in the extreme: productive capacity on the farms was
severely run down, jobs were lost, massive state grants were expended with little or
no lasting benefit, material benefits to the members were virtually nil and
communities were saddled with large debts and unflattering credit records. While it
is difficult to apportion blame for such a catastrophe, there can be little doubt that the
communities were poorly served in their choice of strategic partners. Both strategic
partners and communities, however, are vocal in their criticisms of the state agencies
involved, which imposed an elaborate and untested commercial model, delayed
excessively in release of development grants, failed to monitor (or possibly even
understand) the disastrous performance of the joint venture companies and the risks
this posed for communities.
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39. Minutes of the Board of Directors meeting for July 2010 show that some opposition was expressed from within
the Ravele community to the manager being granted a five-year contract at this rate, from September 2010
(Boardpack July 2010).
40. Interview with Ravele farm manager, 18th August 2010.
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The failure of any material benefits to materialise for the majority of community
members to date raises serious questions over the entire process and gives rise to
social tensions that limit the ability of communities to act effectively. Having made
substantial losses in the years following restoration of land, the communities at
Levubu are now largely living off their capital assets and, in the process, generating a
modest cash income. Whether this will be sufficient to bring the farms back to full
productivity and to achieve sustainable growth in the longer term remains to be seen,
and will depend on access to both investment capital and technical expertise. Ravele
and Masakona communities appear to have turned a corner with the assistance of a
dedicated professional manager and strong CPA leadership, but are still in a survival
mode and are not yet in a position to provide benefits to their members.
A second example of strategic partnership is presented in the case study of Moletele
that follows, which reveals strong similarities but also important differences to the
case of Levubu.
4.  Moletele case study
The Moletele community is a large group of mainly Sepedi (Northern Sotho)
speaking people originating in the South African lowveld, in what is today the south-
eastern portion of Limpopo province (see Figure 1 above). The community has
claimed a vast area of land, in the order of 72,000 hectares, from which they were
removed over many decades, between the 1920s and the 1970s, when white
farmers were settled in the area. 
The area, centred on the small town of Hoedspruit, is today the centre of a large sub-
tropical fruit economy, supplied with irrigation water from the Blyde River. Land that is
not served by the main pipeline is generally used for game farming, cattle ranching,
hunting and wildlife tourism, including some upmarket ranches. The major tourist
attractions of the Blyde River Canyon and the Kruger National Park lie immediately to
the west and east, respectively, and Mpumalanga province lies to the south.
The South African lowveld – the area below 800m in altitude – is known for its high
temperatures and low rainfall. To the west, along the escarpment and the
Drakensburg Mountains, mean annual precipitation can exceed 1,000mm but in low
lying areas to the east and the west of the escarpment, mean annual precipitation is
generally 600mm or less (Raven, 2004: 11). For the Lower Blyde area, around
Hoedspruit, the average yearly rainfall is 513mm and the average maximum and
minimum temperatures for summer and winter are 30.4°C/19.7°C and
25.3°C/11.5°C. Winter temperatures are relatively mild and crop damage from frost
is uncommon.
Prior to the 1930s, African communities and early white pioneers used the lowveld
mainly for hunting and cattle grazing. Only with the introduction of DDT to combat
the tsetse fly and malaria-bearing mosquitoes in the 1930s and 1940s did
permanent commercial crop farming start in the area (Raven, 2004: 13). Production
of sub-tropical fruits greatly intensified following the construction of the
Blyderivierspoort Dam in 1974, with a capacity of approximately 50 million m3, which
allowed white farmers, supported by the Apartheid state, to use sophisticated
irrigation techniques such as centre pivots, sprinklers, and drip irrigation. Corporate
farming enterprises (i.e. large land-holding companies, based outside the area)
accumulated large holdings (some in excess of 1,000 hectares), particularly for
citrus and mango, but these coexisted with many smaller family farmers (typically on
30-40ha holdings) who concentrated on the production of vegetables for the
domestic (South African) market. By the 1990s, the Blyde river irrigation scheme
covered an area of approximately 42,366ha (Raven, 2004: 10).
Forced removal of the Moletele people from their ancestral lands began in the 1920s
and continued up to the 1970s. Sepedi-speaking people and their chiefs were
removed to the ethnic ‘homeland’ of Lebowa, while Shangaan (Tsonga) speakers
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were moved to the adjoining homeland of Gazankulu (Niehaus, 2005). According to
the office of the Regional Land Claims Commissioner for Limpopo, the community
were gradually dispossessed of their land rights under a succession of racially
motivated laws and policies, including the Group Areas Act, Natives Land Act 1913
and Native Trust and Land Act of 1936, the Stock Limitation Act 1950 and labour
tenant legislation:
The Moletele community enjoyed communal customary rights, which were
reduced to beneficiary occupation rights after the arrival of whites. These rights
were further eroded to labour tenancy and they were eventually regarded as
squatters as defined in the Restitution of Land Rights Act 1994.41
Leaders of the community made various efforts over the years to regain their lands,
culminating in the lodgement of numerous claims under the Restitution of Land
Rights Act between 1995 and 1998. These were eventually merged into a single
Moletele Community Land Claim in 2003. Claims were initially lodged on 28 farms,
with 14 more added as part of the investigation process that followed, and amounts
to 78,791 hectares in total.
To date, only around 10% of the claimed land has been returned to the community –
a total of 7,142 hectares, handed over between September 2006 and April 2009.
41. Government Gazette No. 27470. ‘Moletele Tribal Land Claim Acceptance Report’. Republic of South
Africa,Pretoria, 15 April 2005.












This land is in four blocks, comprising 42 distinct portions (i.e. separate title deeds)
and was purchased for a total price of ZAR 183.2 million (USD 26.5 million), making it
already one of the most expensive land restitution cases in South Africa. While most
portions were in the range of 20-250ha, a number were far larger, including the farm
Eden (658ha); Chester (‘remaining extent’, 667ha); Scotia (1,268ha); and Richmond
(2,434ha). Largely due to its exceptional size, Richmond was also by far the most
expensive property, at a purchase price of ZAR 63.9 million (USD 9.2 million).42
The restored land has been transferred in freehold title to the Moletele Communal
Property Association (CPA), a legal entity formed especially to take transfer of the
land on behalf of the claimant community. The CPA was formed in September 2005,
with 15 members on the committee representing different residential areas, plus two
ex-officio members representing the Traditional Council. Estimates vary as to the size
of the claimant community (i.e. the CPA membership): one informant put it at 1,615
claimant families, plus dependents as secondary beneficiaries; others put it at
anywhere between 16,000 and 30,000 individuals.43
The particular parcels of land that have been transferred to the community to date
have largely been determined by the minority of affected white landowners who
expressed a willingness to sell their land to the state for restitution purposes, and
obtained the price they were asking. This explains the rather scattered pattern of
Moletele landholdings at present, but this is set to change once more land is
restored. According to community leaders, many landowners in the area remain
hostile to the restitution process and are challenging the validity of the claim in the
courts, although some feel that this is merely a strategy to drive up the level of
compensation.44
The main focus of the Moletele claim to date has been on acquiring high-value
irrigated land, or land with potential for irrigation, although some dry land outside the
irrigation scheme has also been returned to the community. The main demand – at
least among the CPA leadership and their business partners – is for community
involvement in large-scale commercial farming, as landowners, business partners
and employees. The optimism surrounding the initial return of land to the community
was captured in the words of the Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs at the
official handover in July 2007:
This land that we are restoring today has some of the best oranges and mangos
this country has ever produced. As from today the people of Moletele are now
exporters. You are going to be operating from the well-equipped pack-house that
we have included in the purchase of this land. The pack-house is also used for the
processing and packaging of atchaar (…).
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42. MCPA Property Portfolio Report, April to June 2010.
43. Regional Land Claims Commissioner Acceptance Report (2004); interviews with MCPA financial advisor and
office manager, 11th August 2010.
44. Interview with Molelete financial advisor, 29 November 2010.
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We have also bought two mango drying plants. These will enable the Moletele
Community to engage in value-adding processes on their mangos. These farms
also produce sweet-corn, seed maize and tomatoes. All of these production
processes clearly contribute to the objectives of Accelerated and Shared Growth
Initiatives for South Africa (AsgiSA), which include job creation, poverty eradication,
Agri processing, improvement of the quality of life for all our people (…).
This deal will also accelerate value-adding in the produce coming from this land of
milk and honey. This will ensure participation of the Moletele Community in the
entire value-chain. These partnerships give credence to economic empowerment
because the community will not only receive hand-outs in the form of lease rentals
but will be participating in the day-to-day management of the farms.45
As may be seen, the official emphasis was on high-value commercial operations and
preservation of existing enterprises. Little or no consideration appears to have been
given to subdivision of large farms into smaller ‘family farms’ or conversion to low-
input farming models along the lines currently practiced by many community
members in neighbouring communal areas. Indeed, as at Levubu, the restitution
process is instead leading to consolidation of already large holdings in the area
under the new ownership. A mass return of community members to their ancestral
lands has not been (officially) contemplated, although plans are underway to provide
housing plots on some of the undeveloped land. This commitment to the
preservation of the structure of commercial agriculture in the area on the part of the
community is closely aligned to the official state policy towards restitution in
Limpopo. No particular policy has been developed (by state or community) towards
the large areas of game farms and nature reserves – some containing very high-value
lodges and resorts – that also fall within the ambit of the Moletele claim, and this
category of land would appear to be less of a priority for all parties involved.46
While the community has been pressing for full restoration of all their original land,
cash compensation has been agreed for a few relatively small areas of land that have
been developed for residential purposes. For example, the Leadwood Wildlife Estate
developed by Jordan Developments and managed by Pam Golding Property Group,
is described as a ‘Big 5’ reserve with 500 residential plots for sale. The Regional Land
Claims Commissioner plans to compensate the community for the land, and the
developer is also expected to provide two plots and ZAR 3 million (USD 434,000) 
in cash to the community.47 The CPA expects to receive another ZAR 2.3 million
(USD 333,000) in compensation for residential land at Raptor’s View.
Interviews with community members and local officials, however, revealed a
widespread belief that, having spent substantial sums on their claim so far, the state
45. Speech for the land handover celebration for the Moletele community claim delivered by the Minister for
Agriculture and Land Affairs Ms Lulama Xingwana, Limpopo. 1 July 2007. South African Government Information.
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2007/07071011451003.htm
46. Interview with MCPA Chairperson 12 August 2010.
47. Interview with MCPA financial advisor 11 August 2010; see also Sunday Times (South Africa) 10 April 2005,
‘Property owners told to pay for land claims’ (article by Pregs Govender).
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has now lost interest and, more importantly, has run out of funds to take the process
any further.48 As with other aspects of the Moletele claim (and others in the
province), community members complained of a lack of communication from the
office of the Regional Land Claims Commissioner. 
4.1  Background to the joint ventures at Moletele
According to various informants at Moletele, the original vision for joint ventures
came from the community and certain white landowners, who shared concerns
about the scale of the proposed land transfer, the ability of the community to cope
with its new responsibilities and the potential impact on the local economy. Even
before the claims were finalised, community leaders, landowners and local public
representatives were discussing possible collaboration through the local forum
called the Moletele-Hoedspruit Land Initiative.49 The community members reported
that they were influenced by the reported problems on a number of other high-profile
restitution projects in the region, notably on the nearby Lisbon citrus and mango
estate which collapsed in 2001 with losses reportedly as high as ZAR 90 million
(USD 13 million). According to the Chair of the CPA, ‘we learned lessons from other
(collapsed) claims, and formed a task team with the willing sellers’.
Community leaders were adamant that, from the outset, they preferred a mix of
business models and partners: ‘We didn’t put all our eggs in one basket’ said one.
The Moletele CPA had a strong preference for involving the former owners as
business partners, as they felt they knew them and could trust them. Community
leaders said they had concerns, however, about the degree of transformation that
would actually occur on the farms if the former owners remained in charge, and
persuading former owners to accept community members as part of a management
team was particularly challenging.50
The state agencies involved, which were then heavily promoting the concept of
strategic partnership, insisted that the former landowners could not be the automatic
choice as strategic partners at Moletele and called for expressions of interest from
other parties. After a tender and screening process, three groups of local farm
owners (or former owners) emerged as strategic partners for the Moletele CPA:
Strategic Farm Management (Pty) Ltd, Chestnet (Pty) Ltd and African Realty Trust;
when further land was transferred in 2008, the Boyes Group (who were already
active in Levubu and other restitution cases) became a fourth strategic partner. A
lengthy negotiation process ensued, supported by the Business Trust-MABEDI and
the European Union-funded Limpopo Local Economic Development programme, at
the end of which shareholding and lease agreements were signed between the CPA
and the respective strategic partners.
48. See Mail & Guardian 5 July 2010: ‘Land reform beneficiaries owed R3.4bn by government’.
49. Interview with MCPA office manager, 11 August 2010.
50. Interview with members of MCPA 12 August 2010.
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In addition to the land under the various commercial partnerships, a number of
smaller land portions, which the community considered too small to justify additional
joint ventures, have been leased to neighbouring white farmers. One remaining
property, Scotia farm, a former game farm without irrigation, was retained for use by
the community mainly as communal grazing for its cattle and is where the CPA office
is located.51 The farmhouse is used for adult education classes in computers and
other topics, and the land is earmarked for development of low-cost housing for
community members.
As in the case of Levubu, there have been a number of false starts, and the four
commercial partnerships differ greatly in their level of organisation and degree of
success to date. The community stood to benefit, in theory, from both rental and
dividend income through the joint ventures, as well as preferential employment and
various training opportunities. As in other claims, it was originally intended that
workers on the farms would be included as shareholders in the strategic
partnerships. Indeed, at the official handover of title deeds in July 2007, the Minister
of Land Affairs specifically stated that 2% of shares would be allocated to ‘the
workers’. It would appear, however, that the CPA and the commercial partners
opposed to this, and no allocation was in fact made to workers. Instead, it was
agreed that existing workers would all be retained and only replaced by Moletele
community members on the basis of natural attrition.52
As at Levubu, various state grants were due to be paid to the Moletele CPA, and failure
to transfer these on a timely basis is widely seen as a major reason for the collapse of
some of the partnerships and the ongoing difficulties of others (see below). 
These grants comprised Restitution Discretionary Grants valued at ZAR 4.8 million
(USD 695,000) and Settlement Planning Grants valued at ZAR 2.3 million 
(USD 333,000). More importantly, however, was the Development Assistance
Grant, which (to date) is valued at ZAR 35.2 million (USD 5.1 million). This is
calculated at 25% of the value (purchase price) of the restored land but, as far as
could be ascertained, none of this has been handed over to date.
While the terms ‘strategic partnership’ and ‘joint venture’ are widely used at Moletele,
informants also used the term ‘community-private partnership’ (CPP) to refer to
some of their more recent ventures. The significance of these terms, and other
details of the four main ventures at Moletele, are discussed below.
51. MCPA Property Portfolio Report, June 2010.
52. Interview with MCPA Chairperson, 12th August 2010.
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4.2  Details of the Moletele joint ventures
As noted above, between 2007 and 2010 four large agricultural enterprises were
created on the 47 restored properties, referred to here (and generally in the locality)
as New Dawn, Batau, Dinaledi and Richmond. This is illustrated in Figures 4-5.
The following table shows the main current, or planned, land uses associated with
these enterprises. Together, these activities constitute slightly less than half (48.2%)
of the total land restored to date: the rest comprises approximately 2,000ha of land
reserved for direct use by the community (communal grazing on the farms Scotia and
Eden) and approximately 1,600ha of un-irrigated land on Richmond (albeit with
potential for irrigation if the Blyde irrigation scheme is expanded in the coming years,
as expected), along with a smaller area (150ha) that is leased directly by the CPA to





































































Figure 5. Moletele land claims
New Dawn
New Dawn Farming Enterprise (Pty) Ltd was formed in 2008 as a joint venture
between the Moletele CPA and Strategic Farm Management (SFM), a company
formed specifically for this purpose by a group of local landowners who were bought
out as part of the restitution process. In its original form, New Dawn adhered closely
to the general model of strategic partnership then being promoted by the office of
the Regional Land Claims Commissioner and the Limpopo Department of
Agriculture; over time, however, it has suffered a number of setbacks which have
forced departures from the original model.
This enterprise groups together citrus and mango production on 18 of the farms transferred
in the first batch (2006-07). The total land area is approximately 1,100 hectares,
which was purchased for ZAR 44 million (USD 6.4 million). The productive area
(1,050ha) is planted with approximately 246ha of mango, 140ha of citrus, 7ha of
guava and 3ha of papaya, with 326ha used for extensive grazing. In addition, there
are approximately 50ha of non-agricultural land (roads, houses, sheds, a pack-house
and processing plants). The property was purchased along with a pack-house, a
mango achar processing plant and two mango drying plants. 
The Moletele CPA owns 52% of the shares in New Dawn Farming, and SFM owns
the remaining 48%. The Board of Directors consists of three representatives from
the Moletele CPA, three from SFM and one non-voting representative of the
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Table 3. Agricultural land use for the four partnerships on Moletele CPA land
Entity Agricultural land use (ha)
Current Planned Sub- Total
leases
Citrus Mango Litchi Guava Papaya Grazing Type
New 140 246 - 7 3 326 Citrus 249 79 1,050
Dawn
Batau / 72 62 5 - - 669 - - 13 821
Bono 
SAFE
Dinaledi 320 - - - - - Citrus 310 116 746
Richmond 515 70 - - - - Sugar 240 - 825
cane
Total 1,047 378 5 7 3 995 799 208 3,442
Source: Moletele CPA, Property Portfolio Report, June 2010.
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Limpopo Department of Agriculture. The managing director of the company is one of
the partners in SFM and is responsible for day-to-day management of the enterprise.
The agreement between the partners is for a period of 15 years. Management of the
joint venture is in the hands of SFM, for which it should (according to the
management contract) be paid 5% of the gross turnover of the operating company in
the first year; this percentage will decrease by 0.5% each year thereafter until a
minimum of 2% is reached. It was further agreed that Moletele CPA, as the
landowner, would be paid rent of 1% of the purchase price of the land and 2.5% of
the value of the water rights. Due to ongoing financial difficulties, little of the money
owed has actually been paid over to the community to date.
The citrus and mango grown on these farms is processed on the farm and marketed
through an export company owned by the strategic partners called Alliance Fruit.53
This company has been the biggest supplier of mangos to Marks & Spencer in the
UK for the last ten years. Under the strategic partnership agreement, New Dawn (i.e.
the joint venture, rather than the community) acquired 15% shares in Alliance Fruit
which was intended to give it control over the marketing process and provide the
community with prompt payments and reliable accounts. The pack-house complies
with HACCP and GLOBALG.A.P. standards.54
The farms employ 69 permanent workers and about 117 seasonal workers, with
potential to increase to about 148 permanent and 323 seasonal workers once
proposed additional developments have been implemented.
Despite these valuable assets, and some continuity in the person of the current
managing director, New Dawn has experienced ongoing financial and operational
problems. These can be traced back to the non-payment of most of the Restitution
Discretionary Grant promised by the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights,
and ongoing difficulties in securing alternative capital. The total grant amount due to
the community (intended for investment in the joint venture) is ZAR 11 million 
(USD 1.6 million) but, to date, only ZAR 1.8 million (USD 260,000) has been paid
over, which was used for the purchase of pack-house equipment. This one-off
payment was made in 2009, three years after the land was transferred to the
community and nearly a year after the joint venture was formed. By August 2009,
SFM had already invested ZAR 1.7 million (USD 250,000) in the joint venture in
order to maintain production on the farm, and contributed a further ZAR 624,000
(USD 90,200) in the form of movable assets.55
To date, New Dawn has not made a profit and so no dividend has been paid out to
the community. As with other farms in Moletele and Levubu, the New Dawn
properties were not handed over as ‘going concerns’: rather, the former enterprises
53. Alliance Fruit is described as a producer-owned export group in the citrus and mango sectors, founded in 2003
(http://www.alliancefruit.co.za/).
54. Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) accreditation focuses on hygiene of the total fruit handling
process, including machinery, personnel and buildings.
55. Interview with managing director, New Dawn, 7th July 2010.
were wound down by the former owners and had to be restarted by the new owners
and their commercial partners. Partners were under pressure from the community to
maintain the existing labour force throughout the period of transition, to replace
equipment removed by the former owners and to make good the lack of maintenance
(including replanting of orchards) that was a common feature on most of these
properties during the prolonged process of land purchase and transfer. Production
collapsed, or greatly declined on many of the farms during this time and, as a result,
the farms were run at a considerable loss for an extended period.
Under the strategic partnership agreement, New Dawn is supposed to pay an annual
rent to the Moletele CPA of ZAR 630,000 (USD 91,000) per annum, as long as all
the anticipated funding and conditions were in place. No rental was paid in 2008-
2009 (the first year of formal partnership) – this money is still owed to the CPA – but
for 2009-2010, New Dawn paid approximately ZAR 381,000 (USD 55,000) in rent
to the Moletele CPA. At the same time, the management fee due to SFM for
managing the farm has also gone unpaid during this period, so both partners are
effectively running at a substantial loss.
In the light of the non-transfer of grants from the state agencies, New Dawn has
sought alternative sources of capital, in particular the possibility of a loan from the
state-owned Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA). To this end, a detailed
feasibility plan56 was drawn up by the strategic partner, which included the following
elements: 
• citrus expansion: establishment of 312ha new citrus orchards
• rehabilitation and upgrading of irrigation systems on current citrus orchards
• top-working of 80ha current mango varieties
• upgrading of irrigation systems on mango orchards
• expansion of existing pack-house facility
• upgrading of achar plant
• upgrading of mango de-hydration plant
• new tractors, implements and equipment
• upgrading of infrastructure and buildings 
• equipment for the manufacturing of compost.
The total capital requirement for the above was estimated at ZAR 35 million 
(USD 5.1 million).
By August 2010, it appeared that a loan from the DBSA had been agreed in
principle, but negotiations were ongoing around the guarantees to be provided by
the strategic partners. According to the managing director of New Dawn, the
conditions being demanded by the bank were onerous – including a substantial
financial bond payable by the strategic partner pledging not to leave the farm for a
period of 15 years, or pledging the lease agreement with the community as collateral.
In either case, the strategic partner would be exposed to high (and potentially
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56. Feasibility Study: New Dawn Farming Enterprise Project, August 2008 (unpublished document).
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unacceptable) levels of risk. An alternative suggestion that the CPA directors would
enter into financial guarantees in a personal capacity was also considered
unacceptable and inappropriate. Mortgaging of the land is explicitly forbidden under
the terms of the restitution agreement, so the more conventional means of accessing
credit are also unavailable. All of this suggests that financial institutions – including
those with an explicit ‘development’ focus such as the DBSA – as well as actors in
the wider land reform sector have yet to devise workable means of providing credit
(and managing risk) for land reform ventures of this type.
Batau
Like New Dawn, Batau Farming Enterprise was a joint venture (along the standard
lines) created in 2008 between the Moletele CPA and Chestnet (Pty) Ltd, a group of
landowners who were bought out as part of the restitution process. The land
consists of 975ha, previously divided into six farms, which was purchased in 2006
for ZAR 20.6 million (USD 3 million). The shareholder agreement in this partnership
stipulates a term of 15 years with the Moletele CPA holding 52% of the shares in the
company and Chestnet holding 48%.57 The joint venture was engaged in the
production of mango, citrus and vegetable crops such as maize, cabbage, tomatoes
and peppers, mainly for the local market.
Productive land consists of 62 hectares planted to mango (approximately 45,000
trees), 72ha of citrus (made up of 24ha of grapefruit, 12ha of lemons and 36ha of
oranges – approximately 32,000 trees in total) and 4.75ha of litchis. Vegetables are
grown under shade netting, including 2.25ha of peppers and 5.75ha of tomatoes.
Given the failure of the promised grant funding to materialise, this joint venture faced
problems from the outset. According to community representatives, the strategic
partners were unable (or unwilling) to provide the necessary operating and
development capital themselves, and nor were they successful in obtaining capital
from the banks.58 Other difficulties faced by this venture, according to community
representatives, were the lack of a pack-house on the farm, making it dependent on
external facilities for marketing of its crops, the relatively small areas under citrus,
considerable distances between the portions of land making up the farm, and a top-
heavy management structure (with four former owners, all drawing salaries as
managers), which impacted negatively on cash flow. 
By mid-2010, Batau was no longer able to pay its creditors and was facing
liquidation, and production on the farms effectively ceased. Although it was widely
assumed among community leaders and government officials that strategic partners
would provide working capital, it is clear that some partners were either unable or
unwilling to do so. In July 2010, the community entered into a temporary caretaker
agreement with Bono Holdings to manage the farm and save the citrus harvest.
57. As with other joint ventures in the region, initial proposals to provide some shareholding specifically for workers
(2% in this case) did not materialise.
58. Interview with MCPA members, 11th August 2010.
Bono Holdings is a management and empowerment company owned by SAFE
Farm Ventures (South African Fruit Exporters) and a black South African
entrepreneur. It operates a number of agricultural joint ventures with communities
throughout South Africa. SAFE has a global customer network and plays an
important role in the total fruit export from South Africa and Zimbabwe. Having paid
no rent in 2008 or 2009, the Batau farms contributed a total of ZAR 196,000 
(USD 28,300) to the CPA in 2010, but this was well below what was expected. 
No dividends have been paid out since the land was transferred.
By August 2010, the community was contemplating a long-term lease with Bono
which, it hoped, would be structured as a community-private partnership (see
below).59 Under the proposed agreement, rental would comprise both fixed and
variable components, the later based on profitability, and the company would be
required to give certain assurances in terms of employment and training of
community members.
Richmond
Richmond farm has an area of 2,434ha and was purchased for ZAR 63.9 million
(USD 9.2 million) in April 2009 from African Realty Trust (ART, a group of
landowners). Unlike other farming operations at Moletele, Richmond comprises just
a single portion of land, on one title deed. It is considered to be well equipped, with
its own pack-house on site and a large area (over 500ha) under established citrus
production. 
At the time of land transfer, ART entered into a joint venture agreement with the
Moletele community, reportedly at the behest of the provincial department of
agriculture, but this lasted only six months (April to October 2009). As with the other
joint ventures at Moletele, the joint venture company did not receive the expected
development grants and, according to community informants, the farm deteriorated
to such an extent that the partnership was terminated. Production virtually collapsed
except for juicing of oranges (i.e. lower grade fruit). At this point, the farm then
reportedly required an injection of ZAR 500,000 (USD 72,400) to restore it to
production. The community subsequently entered into a temporary agreement with
Golden Frontier Citrus (GFC)60 to manage the farm between October 2009 and
June 2010, at which point a lease was signed with GFC.61
GFC is a citrus production company, created as a black-empowerment venture by
TSB Sugar62 and the state-owned Industrial Development Corporation (IDC).
According to community representatives, GFC came with a comprehensive
turnaround strategy – described as ‘a mammoth task’ – but the farm was
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59. Interview with MCPA financial advisor, 12th August 2010.
60. See http://www.tsb.co.za/the_company/citrus_holdings/golden_frontiers_citrus/
61. Interview with MCPA Chairperson, 3rd November 2010.
62. TSB Sugar (formerly Transvaal Sugar Board) is a subsidiary of Remgro (formerly Rembrandt), a diversified company
listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange and based at Malelane in Mpumalanga. Its core business activity is the
production of refined and raw sugar that is marketed either nationally, under the Selati brand name, or exported.
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subsequently said to be greatly recovered.63 GFC first entered on a short-term lease
basis but this was subsequently converted into a community-private partnership
(CPP) on a 20-year lease – the longest of any agreement at Moletele or Levubu.
GFC was also seen as having the advantage of access to substantial capital of its
own, as part of a large conglomerate (and in contrast to the former local landowners
who were the strategic partners on the other joint ventures).
No dividends were paid to the community under the partnership with ART in 2009
but an amount of ZAR 611,000 (USD 88,400) was paid to the CPA in rent. Since
the arrival of GFC, a total of ZAR 954,000 (USD 138,000) in rent has been
transferred to the CPA, making this the highest contribution from any enterprise to
date.64
Much of Richmond is currently uncultivated but could be used for sugar cane if the
anticipated expansion of the Blyde irrigation schemes goes ahead.65 There has been
much speculation about a large biofuel plant to be built in the Hoedspruit area. The
state owned Industrial Development Corporation and Central Energy Fund are
reportedly interested in biofuel capacity in the area, and various feasibility studies
have been undertaken. Opposition to this scale of industrial development has been
expressed by tourism and conservation interests in the Hoedspruit area, but it
appears that some compromise is likely in order to keep developments away from
prime tourist attractions and lodges.
By August 2010, efforts were underway to extend the citrus production on another
115ha of land, and a further 240ha of land has been earmarked for sugar cane
plantations with a view to production of ethanol. This would be a logical area of
expansion for Golden Frontier Citrus, given its close ties to TSB Sugar. It is
estimated that production of sugar for biofuel on Richmond could lead to the
employment (direct and indirect) of up to 12,000 workers, which would include out-
growers in the neighbouring communities.66
Dinaledi
Dinaledi is a partnership between the Moletele CPA and the Boyes Group, the same
people who were behind the collapsed SAFM ventures at Levubu. The land in
question comprises 746 hectares in five portions, which were purchased between
November 2007 and October 2008 for a total price of ZAR 31.7 million
(USD 4.6 million). The farm is engaged almost exclusively in citrus production, with
substantial orchards of oranges, grapefruit and lemons. Citrus is exported to
Canada, the EU, Russia, the Middle East, Japan and Mauritius. The operation
provides seasonal employment for some 450 workers.
63. Interview with MCPA Chairperson, 3rd November 2010.
64. Moletele CPA Income Statement, June 2010.
65. Programme for Basic Energy and Conservation (ProBec), Biofuel Newsletter, 18th July 2009.
66. Interview with MCPA financial advisor, 29th November 2010.
No development grants have been received by this partnership to date but,
according to community informants, Boyes Group have been able to invest
substantial amounts in the project, either from their own resources or commercial
credit that they have raised.67 To date, capital has been invested in a new pack-
house and some expansion of orchards. Because the Moletele community was not in
a position to match the investment provided by Boyes Group, the pack-house,
although located on Moletele land, is run as a private venture by Boyes group, not as
part of the joint venture. This was a source of concern to some community
representatives.68 
Ownership of the Dinaledi joint venture was described as 50:50 partnership
between the CPA and the Boyes Group. According to community informants,
granting the commercial partner a full half-share (as opposed to the 48% minority
share more widely applied) was necessary in order to allow the Boyes Group to
engage effectively with financial institutions and be able to make day-to-day-
decisions on their own, without having to consult a majority shareholder.69 Boyes is
seen as an attractive partner as the group had its own finance and was not
dependent on cash inputs from either the community or state agencies. The biggest
factor for the relative success of this partnership, it was reported, was the large
contiguous area under citrus.
The CPA representatives on the Dinaledi board explained the reasons for selecting
this model to the community as a need for long-term investment that would not pay
out dividends in the short term.70 They used the example of the Royal Bafokeng
Nation, a tribe in North-West province that receives vast income from platinum
deposits on its land and has invested in large infrastructure projects and other
ventures designed to yield a sustainable income for the tribe over the longer term. 
In 2009-2010, Dinaledi paid a total of ZAR 622,000 (USD 90,000) in rent to the
CPA,71 making it the second biggest contributor to the community, and was
described by the CPA leaders as the most consistent payer of rent to the community.
As with the other farms, annual rent is set at 1.25 % of the land value at the time of
transfer (ZAR 31.7 million, equivalent to approximately USD 4.6 million). Some
disquiet was expressed by community members, however, that this income was
being held centrally by the CPA committee and no decision had yet been made on
how (or whether) to pass it on to ordinary members.72 According to community
leaders, the Dinaledi partnership has also shown a strong commitment to skills
development and training. The Boyes group donated 16 computers for basic
computer literacy training of young people in the Moletele community. The training
courses run over ten days and trainees receive a certificate of attendance upon
completion. Learners are also offered free transport to the training centre situated at
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67. Interview with MCPA members, 11th August 2010.
68. Interview with MCPA members, 9th July 2010.
69. Interview with MCPA members, 11th August 2010.
70. Interview with MCPA representatives, 12th August 2010.
71. Moletele CPA Income Statement 2009-10.
72. Interview with MCPA members, 9th July 2010.
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Scotia farm where the MCPA based their offices. Additionally, the Boyes group has
invested money to improve the CPA offices which is now boasting a few fully
equipped offices, a reception area and a boardroom.
4.3  Concluding remarks: Moletele
Moletele is a vast and complex restitution case, although only one-tenth of the total
land under claim has been transferred to date. Budgetary and other constraints on
the part of the relevant state agencies have raised doubts about how much more
land will eventually be restored to the community. Initial experiments with joint
ventures involving former landowners, in particular, gave rise to major difficulties,
especially around access to working capital, with two out of three collapsing. The
fourth venture, with the Boyes group – a larger commercial company – seems to
have done somewhat better. Unlike the situation at Levubu, where development
grants were used up and communities were left with large debts, the particular
problem at Moletele is that the bulk of grants were never actually provided by the
state.73 This has led to the negotiation of new community-private partnerships with
better-resourced commercial partners such as Golden Frontier Citrus and Bono-
SAFE.
Granting exclusive control of commercial operations to the external partners makes
such deals more attractive to them and, most importantly, makes the ventures more
acceptable in the eyes of the banks. From the perspective of the community
leadership, participation in all aspects of commercial operations remains the ideal,
but there is a growing awareness that the community is not well prepared for this role
and that full joint ventures may not actually be workable under current conditions. The
hope remains that some benefits over and above annual rentals, particularly in the
form of employment and training opportunities, can be obtained under the CPP
model, while also preparing the community for an expanded business role in the
future, but this is no longer central to the deal. While profitability and the need for
investment are uppermost in the minds of community leaders and their business
partners, the ordinary membership is undoubtedly more concerned with the delays in
distributing any material benefits among the community.74 Income accruing to the
CPA has been modest to date, but little attention appears to have been paid to how
and when this can be shared with the membership.
73. See Mail & Guardian 5th July 2010: ‘Land reform beneficiaries owed R3.4bn by government’.
74. Interview with MCPA members, 12th August 2010.
5.  Analysis and discussion
Strategic partnerships with commercial operators have been widely promoted as a
means of maintaining productivity and facilitating access to high-value markets for
South African communities under the restitution programme. This in turn is expected
to maximise benefits to community members while preserving valuable assets and
growing the rural economy. The cases of Levubu and Moletele described here
suggest that the experience to date is not meeting these expectations and is highly
problematic in economic, social and political terms.
In this section we attempt to analyse the findings of the case studies under a number of
key headings, before reaching some general conclusions and policy recommendations.
5.1  The strategic partnership model
In all the communities consulted, the initial preference (at least amongst the
leadership) was for a comprehensive joint venture arrangement that would make
maximum use of the returned land. The joint venture model is defended by
community leaders at both Levubu and Moletele (but not in general by their business
partners) as having the potential to involve the communities in all aspects of
agriculture, maximise benefits to the community in terms of income, jobs and
management skills, while preparing them for the eventual take-over of the enterprises
after 10 or 15 years. There can be little doubt, however, that this preference was
greatly influenced by the state agencies responsible for restitution, especially as the
restoration of land and pay-out of development grants was effectively made
conditional upon acceptance of this model. It is also questionable to what extent this
model ever enjoyed the support of the general membership of the communities,
some of whom would have preferred direct access to land either for residential
purposes or for agricultural production on their own account. Also questionable, in
the light of experience, is the extent to which state officials understood the model that
they were promoting, and their competence in terms of both direct participation in
the process (i.e. provision of funding) and ensuring compliance with contractual
agreements by the various groups concerned. 
While all parties consulted across all ventures at Levubu and Moletele had a litany of
problems and complaints, three main issues stand out as barriers to the success of
joint ventures. First is their sheer complexity, and the challenge of involving relatively
inexperienced community representatives in complex management issues: this,
coupled with the need to involve hundreds or even thousands of community
members in key decisions – particularly in the absence of tangible benefits – has, by
all accounts, rendered the model virtually unworkable. 
Second is the failure (whether due to inability or unwillingness) of the commercial
partners to access sufficient working and investment capital. This is related to the
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complex and experimental nature of the strategic partner model which, along with
their general failure to service their loans, has made the enterprises unattractive to
commercial lenders. Implicit in the original vision of strategic partnerships, as
espoused by the state agencies and echoed by most community leaders, was the
assumption that strategic partners had both the necessary technical expertise to
manage the enterprises and the ability to independently access capital – that is, to
use their own resources or guarantees, and without putting community members or
their property at risk. In retrospect, it can be said that such an assumption was naive
with respect to the financial viability of the new enterprises and their acceptability to
commercial banks, in particular, but also the supposed willingness of partners to put
their own resources at risk. It does appear, however, that the assumptions about the
ability of the strategic partner to provide working capital diminished over time, to the
point where all parties – communities, state agencies and the commercial partners
themselves – accepted that access to capital was dependent on provision of
substantial grants from the state.
The third main obstacle to success of the joint ventures is, therefore, the failure of
such grants to materialise, or to materialise in time: this hampered farming operations
from the very start, exacerbated the lack of creditworthiness of the operations and
undoubtedly led to the failure of many of the ventures. So, while it would be incorrect
to suggest that finance was the only challenge facing these ventures, financial
difficulties – including shortages of working capital and disputes around
responsibility for provision of capital – were certainly the major concern raised by all
parties involved in this study, well ahead of other matters such as farming operations
more generally or coordination across large community groups. 
With the collapse or near-collapse of most of the initial joint ventures, communities
and partners started exploring various alternatives, albeit under considerable
financial difficulties and growing scepticism on the part of many community
members. In the case of the Ravele community at Levubu, this has led to a
partnership with a single individual in the role of expert-manager, who is remunerated
by means of salary and access to high-value agricultural land. Ownership – of both
fixed property and the business venture – now rests firmly with the community, as
does commercial risk. Whether this business model is more successful than the
former joint venture remains to be seen, but the early evidence looks promising. At
Moletele, the community is moving away from joint ventures towards what it calls a
community-private partnership (CPP), in response to financial and other difficulties
experienced during the first years.
The concept of community-private partnership entails a lease on the land
accompanied by some added social benefits, such as management training and
mentoring for community members. Rental is set as a combination of a fixed amount
plus a variable amount based on operating profits, over a 20-year term.75 A CPP
differs from a joint venture in that the commercial partner retains full ownership of the
75. Interview with MCPA Chairperson, 3rd November 2010.
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commercial venture and of any capital it invests in the venture, without the
requirement for the community to match this investment. It effectively gives the
commercial partner a free hand when attempting to raise capital from the market, and
complete control over commercial operations, within the terms of the general
agreement with the community. Our research at Moletele suggests that commercial
partners are more willing to invest under these conditions than under a full strategic
partnership/joint venture, despite assuming all the risk, and believe that they will also
be more likely to obtain bank credit.
From the community’s perspective, the CPP model is easier to manage as they do
not have to sit on a board of directors or participate directly in management decision.
This, according to one informant, would avoid the problem of inequality (in terms of
knowledge and expertise) between the two sets of directors within a joint venture.76
This is particularly important in the case of Moletele where the CPA is involved
simultaneously in multiple partnerships. Although this arrangement may, on paper, be
less remunerative than the strategic partnership/joint venture model, it is, from the
perspective of the community, more than off-set by the increased chance of
commercial success for the venture. Such success is essential to the sustainability of
rental income and employment, including of managers recruited from the community.
It also does not preclude the community from becoming involved in downstream
activities, either on its own or in alliance with one of its existing partners. 
A major difference between current efforts to (re)negotiate partnerships and the
original round of agreements entered into immediately following the transfers of land
is the absence of grant funding to the communities – funding appears to have been
spent with little lasting benefit to local communities in the case of Levubu, and
seemingly delayed indefinitely in the case of Moletele. The lack of support from state
agencies (especially the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, the
office of the Regional Land Claims Commissioner and the Limpopo Department of
Agriculture) in this round of restructuring contrasts starkly with the strong
interventions made by these agencies to impose their original vision of strategic
partnerships based on joint ventures. The belated (and still tentative) involvement of
additional state agencies, such as the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and
the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), with relevant business and
financial expertise is, however, a positive development, and should have been
considered much earlier.
5.2  Benefits to the community
Alongside the major commercial difficulties being experienced by all the projects
discussed here, the most obvious weakness is the lack of material benefits reaching
the great majority of community members. Twelve years after the lodgement of their
restitution claims, and five years after the return of the first lands, most households
76.  Interview with MCPA financial advisor, 29th November 2010.
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have yet to see any positive impact on their livelihood. This is a source of great
frustration for many, given the expectations that were raised by the restoration of the
land and the establishment of commercial partnerships with private-sector
operators, the huge sums of public money consumed and the extensive participation
by community members over many years in discussions and planning exercises.
The limited revenues that have been received by CPAs to date have been in form of
land rentals, which have been intermittent and generally well below the expected
rates. None of the enterprises studied have yet made a profit – indeed, substantial
losses have been the norm – and so dividends, expected by many to be the main
form of revenue from the strategic partnerships, have not materialised.
Considerable confusion exists around what has happened to the limited revenues
received by the CPAs, although it is clear that none has been paid out directly, in
cash or kind, to the general membership. Community leaders were generally found
not to be in favour of paying out cash benefits to members (and under the prevailing
financial conditions this would have been very difficult), and were actively involved in
dampening down popular expectations, but did acknowledge that people could not
wait indefinitely to see some benefits from their ‘successful’ restitution claim. Some
of the income accruing to the CPAs has been used to fund day-to-day CPA
activities, including paying for office overheads, reimbursing the expenses of
committee members, transporting community members to meetings and, at least in
the case of Moletele, employing one CPA committee member on a full-time basis.
Other revenue paid – or owed – to the CPAs has been reinvested in farming
activities, or used to pay debts owed to banks and other suppliers. At Dinaledi, CPA
funds were reportedly invested in a new pack-house, while at Ravele funds were
loaned by the CPA to the commercial farming operation for general operating
expenses. All of the communities consulted at Levubu were in the process of paying
off substantial bank loans incurred by the failed strategic partnerships. In very few
cases were ‘public goods’ provided to community members. Exceptions included
the construction of a tribal office at Shigalo, and the provision of computer training for
young people at Moletele. Many communities were, however, using former farm
houses for CPA meetings.
Given the many problems being experienced by the centralised joint venture
operations, it is perhaps surprising that so few opportunities were being provided for
individuals or small groups to start their own enterprises on the restored land. This
can be related to efforts by all the main parties – the state, CPA committees and their
commercial partners – to control all activities centrally through the CPA and to
maintain the integrity of the established commercial farming operations. Any attempt
to provide economic opportunities to individuals could also exacerbate inequalities
within the communities, as such opportunities could not be distributed evenly among
the membership and not all members would be able or willing to avail of them
anyway. At Moletele, for example, it was reported that efforts had been made to
contract-out transportation and pruning services to community members, but no
tenders were forthcoming.
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The return of communities to their ancestral land – whether for residential purposes
or small-scale farming – might be expected as one of the primary benefits of land
restoration but, as discussed above, this is seen as incompatible with the
preservation of large-scale commercial agriculture and has been actively opposed
by the leading actors involved in the process. No examples could be found at Levubu
of members acquiring plots for their own use, despite the availability of considerable
unused areas of land. The one exception was a tribal chief who had occupied an
existing farmhouse. At Moletele, a handful of small agricultural plots (including plots
under shade-netting) had been allocated for citrus and vegetable production by
community members, at Batau (on the farm Antioch) and on New Dawn but these
were seen largely as ‘nursery’ projects where specific skills could be acquired, rather
than as an alternative model of land use which could benefit the wider community
membership.
At Moletele, but not at Levubu, there has been extensive discussion around the
building of new housing settlements, with a proposal to establish up to 500 houses
on the un-irrigated lands of Scotia farm. The CPA was reportedly in discussion with
the provincial Department of Housing and the local municipality with a view to
providing low-cost (‘RDP’77) housing for its members. This would undoubtedly meet
some of the demand for direct benefits from community members, although
contributing their own land in order to acquire public housing to which they might
already be entitled is, again, a rather limited form of benefit. Plans are also underway
to establish intensive poultry and piggery projects, and possibly a cattle feedlot, on
the site, with support from the provincial Department of Agriculture.
5.3  Training and mentorship
Training and mentorship for community members was a key element within the
original vision for strategic partnerships in land reform and continues to feature in
discussions around new variations on the business model at both Moletele and
Levubu. This is not surprising given the pressing need for skills development within
the community and the desire that community members would, in time, take over the
running of the high-value commercial operations on the restored farms. 
The appointment of community members to supervisory and management positions
within the new enterprises, and the provision of relevant training has occurred to a
limited extent (although not on all the farms), but is constrained by the ongoing
financial problems facing the enterprises. At New Dawn, for example, trainee
managers have been appointed on short-term contracts but cannot be confirmed
until the financial situation improves. The greatest progress has been made at
Ravele, where members of the community have been appointed to oversee all
aspect of operations in the fields, the pack-houses and the office, under the
supervision of the general manager, and are receiving ongoing training and
77. So-called after the government’s Reconstruction and Development Programme.
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mentoring both on and off the farms. A certain amount of training has also been
provided to the wider community membership and particularly to the CPA
committees, either by the strategic partners themselves, as in the case of computer
training provided to school leavers by Dinaledi, and training in book-keeping
provided by GFC. Also at Moletele, both the Business Trust-MABEDI and the
European Union-funded Limpopo Local Economic Development programme,
working through the University of Pretoria, have provided capacity building and
training to the CPA committee members and their representatives on the various
boards of directors.
A potential avenue for acquisition of skills that has not been widely used to date in
either of the cases is the creation of opportunities for members of the community to
develop production, processing or marketing operations on their own account. This
has happened by default at Shigalo and Ratombo farms in Levubu where, following
the withdrawal of strategic partners, community members have been left trying to
manage operations on their own. This, however, is under extremely adverse
conditions, and it is questionable how beneficial this experience of crisis
management might be in the longer term. A group of seven women from the Moletele
community have, however, secured 2ha of shade-netting for vegetable production.
At least part of the reason for the failure to allocate individual plots may be the often-
stated desire to maintain already-fragile cohesion within the large communities
involved, which might be undermined by the perception that a privileged few were
gaining special advantages. It could also be seen as undermining the territorial
integrity of the farms in question, the preservation of which (and hostility to
subdivision) has been an article of faith for all the leading actors to date.
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5.4  Upstream and downstream activities
Virtually all the activity by communities discussed here has focused on production of
primary commodities, with little or no emphasis on upstream or downstream
processes. Production alone has proved to be very challenging, however, due to a
range of factors discussed in detail in the case studies, including the poor condition
of many of the farms at the time of handover, long delays in accessing working capital
and the shifting levels of engagement by successive strategic partners, to name but
a few.
A focus on primary production is, however, appropriate for a number of reasons. The
crops produced at Levubu and Moletele are mostly high-value horticultural
commodities such as oranges, mangos, bananas, avocados and macadamias.
Although these crops require relatively high levels of inputs and technical expertise,
their potential to generate a sizable cash income (suitable for distribution to large
numbers of non-participating community members) is undoubtedly high. In addition,
production is labour intensive, both in the field and in the pack-houses, and is
therefore suitable for employing sizable numbers of community members, many of
whom are currently unemployed. Furthermore, as shown at Ravele, such crops
require considerable technical and supervisory expertise at a management level,
thereby creating potential for graduated training programmes that could, over time,
nurture a class of professional farm managers drawn from the communities. Finally,
the favourable climatic location and high levels of historical investment in these farms,
especially in terms of irrigation, gives them a strong comparative advantage over
other areas, all of which makes a compelling argument for a focus on primary
production.
Restitution claimants at Levubu and Moletele can benefit from well-developed and
competitive markets for upstream and downstream goods and services. While some
of the established producers in both areas have, over time, invested agricultural
profits in processing facilities and marketing companies, this is not general across
the sector, with many successful producers relying on the market for ancillary
services. Nearly all of the farms visited have functioning packing plants on site for the
high-volume commodities such as citrus and bananas. Given the technical and
financial challenges already faced by communities in maintaining production alone, it
would seem unwise and unnecessary for them to diversify into value-added
processes at this time. 
5.5  Role of the Communal Property Associations
As noted above, virtually all the communities at Levubu and Moletele – with the
exception of Tshakhuma – have organised themselves as Communal Property
Associations (CPAs), a legal format specifically designed to allow communities to
hold land collectively, in freehold, under the land reform programme. The
communities discussed here, including their leaders, had a very limited grasp of how
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CPAs were intended to operate, and no reference was made at any time to a written
constitution, the foundational document of any CPA. At most, the CPA can be said to
be the registered owner of the land and a leadership structure, with little of the
dynamism or internal democracy envisaged in the legislation. This lack of
appreciation of the distinct nature of the CPA model at the community level is
reflected at the provincial and national levels, where none of the administrative and
legal support promised by the state at the time of the passing of the legislation has
materialised.
The limited function of the CPAs is most evident in their lack of regular meetings and
particularly in their lack of leadership elections. With few exceptions, the current
leadership of the CPAs – that is, the executive committees and particularly the
powerful chairpersons – have remained unchanged since the time of lodgement of
the claims and before the lands were restored to the communities. While some
communities hold annual gatherings, these appeared to be more in the nature of
‘report back meetings’ rather than formal Annual General Meetings (as required by
the CPA constitutions and legislation), and generally do not serve as decision-
making occasions. Elections for most of the committees are now due, if not
over-due, but there appeared to be little appetite for them. Indeed, at Moletele, there
was distinct unease about the prospect of an election, seemingly based not on a
desire by existing office holders to cling to power but rather a fear that the elections
would be divisive for the community and that a new committee might undo much of
what has been achieved.78
Despite this democratic deficit, CPAs, or at least their executive committees,
continue to function to varying degrees. CPA committee members have engaged in
all aspects of negotiations and operations with state institutions such as the office of
the Regional Land Claims Commissioner and the provincial Department of
Agriculture and, of course, with the various strategic partners. How effective they
were in the latter is an open question, given the failure of many of these ventures, with
frequent comments made at both Levubu and Moletele to the effect that the CPA
representatives did not fully understand what was happening within the commercial
operations or, alternatively, were not given the information they needed in order to
fully participate.
This points to another tension within communities: between the CPAs (or their
executive committees) and their representatives – generally four or five – on the
boards of directors of the joint venture companies. Once the initial agreements were
made to form joint ventures, the centre of power was effectively transferred to the
boards of directors where, by all accounts, CPA representatives relied heavily on the
commercial partners for guidance. CPA leaders and ordinary members at Levubu
and Moletele complained about not being kept informed of proceedings within the
co-owned commercial operations, but this reflects the marginalisation of community
representatives themselves within these structures. The fact that the representatives
78.  Interview with MCPA members, 12th August 2010.
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of the provincial Department of Agriculture also appear to have been overwhelmed
by the complexity of the commercial operations, especially at Levubu, as evidenced
by their apparent failure to grasp the dire financial problems that arose, or to
intervene appropriately, only shows the difficulties encountered by non-specialised
directors faced with complex financial transactions.
Another weakness in the CPA model is evidenced in the ongoing uncertainty around
membership. In all the communities consulted, criteria for membership of the CPA
have been hotly debated, and membership lists have gone through multiple versions.
At Levubu, communities have applied the category of ‘member’ to denote direct
(adult) descendants of people who were members of the community at the time of
dispossession. The additional category of ‘beneficiary’ is used to denote adult
relatives and dependents of the members. The lists of members and beneficiaries at
Levubu now appear to be fixed and widely agreed. It should be noted, however, that
the law does not provide any detailed guidance on the matter of membership (or
beneficiaries) – rather, the community as a whole is deemed to be the legal heir of
the community that suffered dispossession, and a community may determine who its
current members are, regardless of direct links to individuals who were
dispossessed. At Moletele, where the potential pool of members and beneficiaries is
vast compared to any of the Levubu communities, no agreement has yet been
reached as to a membership list or, it appears, a clear definition of members or
beneficiaries. 
Although inherently a difficult task given the size of the community and its multiple
internal divisions, the lack of finality can be seen to reflect a lack of clarity around the
precise entitlements and obligations of members, particularly in the absence of
distribution of material benefits. Developing clear criteria for CPA membership,
confirming membership and building capacity among members to participate in all
aspects of CPA activity are areas where support from the Department of Rural
Development and Land Reform – the relevant state agency – would be most useful,
but has not been forthcoming to date. If and when CPAs get around to distribution of
benefits, clear and agreed membership lists and robust internal processes will be of
critical importance in terms of democracy, transparency and accountability.
The development of CPAs as independent, representative and effective structures is
closely related to, and potentially compromised by, their relations with the tribal (or
traditional) authorities in their areas. All of the land claimants at Levubu and Moletele
are constituted as historical, tribal communities. The official requirement that land be
restored to specially created (and supposedly democratic) structures is an attempt
to side-step existing tribal institutions, but has resulted in a variety of often-uneasy
relationships between the two. None of the CPA chairpersons (all men) were closely
associated with the tribal authorities, but all the CPA committees included members
of the tribal authorities in an ex-officio (i.e. unelected) capacity. In two of the
communities at Levubu, informants described the CPA committees as dominated by
the tribal leaders, but at Ravele there was widespread agreement that the
relationship with the tribal leadership, although close, was a harmonious one. 
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At Moletele, the presence of the chief’s brother on the CPA executive committee was
reported as essential in maintaining communications and trust between the two
institutions. In the absence of regular elections or other manifestations of the
democratic process, however, it is difficult to say how independent any of the CPAs
are from established elites and power structures within their respective communities,
and what the implications of this might be.
Many of the CPAs consulted have very limited capacity for effective management of
their own finances and general operations, in terms of skilled bookkeepers and the
like. Some rely heavily on the commercial partners in this regard. At Ravele, however,
one member of the executive committee works full-time on behalf of the CPA; he has
received extensive business training and liaises closely with the general manager of
the farming operations. At Moletele, in addition to a full-time employee of their own
(also a member of the executive committee), the CPA benefits from the services of a
full-time advisor, funded through the Business Trust-MABEDI. While those
communities with functioning business ventures were generally producing regular
financial and other reports on the farming operations, Moletele was the only CPA
producing regular accounts for the CPA itself, including details of income (from
various sources), expenditure, assets and liabilities. In part, this has been forced on
Moletele by its (unique) involvement in four distinct business ventures, as well as a
number of lesser commercial arrangements, therefore making it inappropriate for it to
align its affairs too closely with any one partner. Nonetheless, the professionalism of
the Moletele CPA stands out, in terms of its business procedures, its reporting
structures and its dealings with multiple business partners.
5.6  Workers’ participation and employment on the farms
A key promise of land reform was the prospect of employment for community
members on the farms. This is particularly important in the context of the political
pressure to maintain the integrity of the existing farm units that amount to an effective
ban on subdivision of the land or residential settlements, either of which might spread
the benefits of restitution more widely.
Despite the existence of a legal minimum wage, and legislation protecting the rights
of workers, farm work is generally considered to be amongst the lowest paid and
unattractive type of work in South Africa, especially for those with some education.
While community leaders view farm employment as one of the benefits of restitution,
they (and their commercial partners) are constrained by the financial pressures on
the companies, and competition within the sector, in terms of both the volume and
the quality of employment they can provide. Community leaders also highlighted the
pitfalls of employing community members, who might (correctly) view themselves as
co-owners of the land; as a result, many people from outside the claimant community
continue to be employed, thereby limiting potential benefits to the claimant
community. At Molelete, community members had a strong preference for indoor
work, in the pack-houses, over field work, although both paid the same rate.
A feature of the original proposal for strategic partnerships, as promoted by the state
agencies around the time of land transfer, was the intention to reserve a minority
shareholding in any new ventures specifically for farm workers. While figures of 
5-10% were mentioned in discussions at this time, the figure that featured in most
strategic partnership agreements was just 2%. In this, both CPA leaders and
commercial partners appear to have been in broad agreement on the need to keep
workers’ participation to a minimum. 
It is important to note that the original proposals for workers’ participation referred to
the existing labour force, and was thus a well-meaning attempt to safeguard the
position of existing workers during the transition to new ownership, especially as many
of them were not members of the claimant communities. The vehicle for achieving
workers’ participation was to be a specially created workers’ trust, which would hold
shares on behalf of the workers on each farm. A major flaw in the restitution process
was that no agency was given responsibility for the establishment of such a trust, and
workers themselves were generally not represented in negotiations around the
settlement of claims on the farms where they worked. As a result, no workers’ trusts
have been established on any of the farms at Levubu or Moletele, and the issue of
workers’ participation appears to have disappeared from the policy agenda. 
Farm workers were particularly vulnerable during the transition process when
responsibility for the farms in general, and for wage bills in particular, was often
unclear or contested. While informants at Moletele insisted that most (if not all) of the
original workforce on the farms was retained throughout the transition process, there
was certainly evidence at Levubu that many workers went for long periods without
payment and some were, as a result, forced to abandon the farms without receiving
any of their statutory entitlements. No evidence could be found of workers being
forced out once farming operations had been re-established under community (or
joint) control. At both Ravele and Moletele, the policy now is to retain existing
workers but to give preference to community members in all new recruitment.
Although no reliable figures could be found, anecdotal evidence suggests that
employment levels on virtually all the farms is down from what it was under the
previous owners, and in some cases considerably so. Many workers have faced
recurring non-payment of wages and there would appear to have been a
considerable shift from permanent to seasonal contracts, implying a diminution of
overall benefits. Apart from some training opportunities, and perhaps a somewhat
more humane labour regime, no evidence could be found of significant
improvements in the general wages and conditions on the community-owned farms. 
Overall, employment opportunities have not provided much net benefit to CPA
members, while falls in overall employment (if only temporary as part of the transition
process) are likely to have impacted negatively on income accruing to the wider local
communities.
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6.  Conclusion and recommendations
This report has examined experience with joint ventures between companies and
communities in South Africa’s agricultural sector, focusing on two case studies. This
experience arose in the context of South Africa’s land reform programme. It shows
how dispossessed communities, whose experience of agriculture was largely limited
to small-scale farming in communal areas and employment on white-owned
commercial farms, have found themselves in charge of highly-developed and complex
farming operations. In an effort to preserve productivity, and provide sustainable
benefits to community members, the state has promoted a model of strategic
partnership between communities and commercial operators of various types, mainly
involving joint ventures. For a variety of reasons, some to do with inherent weaknesses
in the model, and some to do with the behaviour of the key actors, all but one of the
first rounds of strategic partnerships collapsed, some with spectacular losses.
Benefits to communities to date have been negligible and it would appear that the
farms in question have experienced considerable decline in terms of employment,
assets, profitability and contribution to the local and national economy. Nonetheless,
some communities, with support from a few private-sector operators, are in the
process of restoring productivity on the farms and developing alternative business
models that can replace the now-discredited strategic partnerships.
Strategic partnerships in the form of joint ventures were an ambitious experiment in
including communities in all aspects of agricultural enterprises. Among the key
weaknesses in this model identified in this study are: vast difference (in knowledge
and experience) between communities and their commercial partners; lack of
agreement around precise responsibilities of the commercial partners, particularly
with respect to provision of working capital; long delays on the part of the state in
transferring the land and releasing grant funding; and a failure, particularly on the part
of the provincial Department of Agriculture, to monitor and regulate the contractual
agreements between the parties. 
The first round of joint ventures were largely about horizontal integration within the
agricultural sector, as existing farming operations were merged into larger units,
which remained focused on production of primary commodities. For some of the
initial strategic partners, this meant a significant increase in scale of operations.
Subsequent events at Levubu, in particular, reinforced this tendency, as partners
with links to downstream processing and marketing operations withdrew from the
area. The recent introduction of larger, corporate partners at Moletele, however,
signals a shift towards greater vertical integration, as the expanded farming units are
linked into companies with extensive downstream interests in agricultural processing
and marketing. What this means in terms of benefits (or risks) for the community, or
for the sustainability of partnerships at Moletele, remains to be seen, and should be
the focus of future research.
There can be little doubt that the prospects of large operating profits, management
fees and government grants were important in attracting commercial partners to
these ventures. Whether this was matched by a sense of social responsibility is
difficult to say. Many of the partners are too small to realistically include social
responsibility as part of their mission. Some of the larger ones, including Umlimi,
Boyes, GFC and Bono-SAFE, align themselves to some degree with the broad
national programme of BEE. But overall, it is too early to say whether the current
corporate partners at Levubu and Moletele have embraced an ‘inclusive’ business
model or are operating along more traditional profit-seeking lines.
For community members, the joy of regaining their ancestral lands has been
tempered by difficult negotiations around commercial operations, financial setbacks
and a general failure of benefits to materialise. A policy of preserving the structure of
the commercial farms, and even consolidating them in many cases, was premised on
maximising the financial returns to community members although, as experience has
shown, it also exposed them to unacceptable levels of risk. While community
members have shown great patience, even passivity, to date, there is likely to be
ongoing pressure for more direct access to the fruits of restitution, including the right
to live on the farms and use the land for small-scale, household-level, production.
This tension between centralised, high-value agriculture, with indirect (or much
delayed) benefits, versus disaggregated, low-value agriculture and resource
extraction with short-term benefits is set to persist, and it is likely that a balance
between the two will have to be found in any future ventures.
Although largely neglected to date, the internal coherence and procedures of
community groups (e.g. Communal Property Associations) will require attention from
policy makers at some point. Both large and small communities are in need of
external assistance in understanding the function of a CPA, building capacity among
members and leaders, and supporting a democratic culture. Despite efforts by at
least one non-governmental association, and private-sector bodies such as the
Business Trust, most communities are still in need of professional legal, financial and
management services, with regard to their business ventures and how they organise
their internal affairs.
The role of state agencies such as the provincial Department of Agriculture and the
Commission on Restitution of Land Rights has been critical throughout the
restitution process, in terms of restoring the land, promoting the strategic partnership
model and, most problematically, in the provision of grants. By mid-2010, most
support to land reform projects had dried up as the Department of Rural
Development and Land Reform was facing a severe budgetary crisis; as a result, the
prospects for further land transfers or grant support is unpromising for the
foreseeable future. Nonetheless, there is still a vital role for the state to play in terms
of safeguarding the assets of communities, monitoring compliance with contractual
agreements and exploring new, more flexible options for land use.
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The consequences for the state, and for the wider society, of the failure of large
restitution projects such as Levubu and Moletele are undoubtedly great. The vast
expenditures already incurred, with few tangible benefits to show for it, adds to the
already vociferous criticisms of the policy of transferring valuable assets to poor
communities. This provides ammunition to the critics of land reform and the wider
redistributive policies of the state, and creates opportunities for opportunistic
interventions from across the political spectrum. The slow pace and questionable
benefits of land reform to date have added to calls for more interventionist strategies,
particularly the expropriation of white-owned lands without compensation, although
as this and other studies show, the problem is not just the acquisition of land but
what happens to it subsequently. Pro-business groups have also been vocal in
calling for redistribution programmes to focus more on better-off individuals who
have the means to use assets productively, thereby potentially reducing the rights
basis of restitution and the inclusion of relatively poor households.
Despite these many problems, there are signs of positive developments on some of
the farms at Levubu and Moletele. These all involve a retreat from the complexity of
joint ventures and efforts to reduce the risks to communities. The downside of this
may be some lost opportunities in terms of management training and sharing of
profits, which have been largely ephemeral to date, in favour of a more reliable
income stream. The so-called community-private partnerships emerging at Moletele
are effectively long-term lease agreements, with some additional social benefits.
Partners such as GFC and Bono-SAFE, with extensive interests in closely allied
sectors, would appear to offer reliable partnerships, although monitoring of
compliance with contracts will remain a concern. Largely unaddressed under this
newer models is the question of long-term development of the farming assets,
particularly in areas such as replanting of orchards, and there remains the risk that
lease agreements could lead to the erosion of asset values over time. 
Another emerging model is that of partnership with individual entrepreneurs, as is the
case at New Dawn and Ravele. This approach relies on the continued involvement of
the communities in operating the farms and on the good will of key individuals. These
farms enjoy a relatively good income stream from crops such as bananas, citrus and
macadamias and, with careful management and cost control, seem capable of
generating a modest operating profit. Whether this will translate into a dividend for
community members, especially in the absence of alternative sources of investment
capital, remains to be seen. 
Most vulnerable of all at this time are those communities, such as Ratombo, without
any partnerships. A few individuals have managed to maintain production at a very
basic level, through harvesting standing crops, but, in the absence of investment
capital this cannot be sustained. And while decentralised production by individuals
and small groups would appear to be a rational response to the collapse of
centralised management, this is adding to tensions within the community, and may
not be appropriate where infrastructure is shared across large units. For all the
communities without a lease agreement, access to capital stands out as a top
priority and, given the bruising experience of many at the hands of commercial banks,
there would appear to be an urgent need for involvement by agencies such as the
Industrial Development Corporation and the Development Bank of Southern Africa. 
Overall, these studies reveal that the business models promoted as part of land
reform in South Africa have not yet succeeded in producing sustainable enterprises
or distributing benefits to community members. Now that communities are secure in
the ownership of their land, renewed efforts are required from the state, private
sector, non-profit organisations and community members alike to identify land-use
models more suited to low-income communities, that can deliver sustainable
benefits in terms of employment, housing, land for own use and cash income. 
From an international perspective, the lessons of strategic partnerships within South
Africa’s land reform programme appear to be largely negative. Not enough material
progress has been made in any of the cases outlined here to conclude that this type
of strategic partnership is financially viable or can deliver sustainable benefits to
communities over time. Despite a promising start – including freehold land title
vested in communities, favourable conditions for production of high-value
agricultural commodities and generous state support – it is clear that some
fundamental errors have been made in the design and implementation of these
ventures. On the community side, the precise role of ordinary members has never
been clarified: no opportunities have been provided for small-scale farmers; on-farm
employment has not materialised for the majority (and is unlikely to do so under even
the most optimistic scenarios); and, to date, no share of profits has been
forthcoming. Thus, unlike other international examples, most members have not been
included in these ventures as either workers or independent producers, making them
little more than passive shareholders in what are up to now poorly-performing
companies. On the strategic partner side, no firm commitments have been made
regarding investment of capital or sharing of risk and little thought appears to have
been given to the specific challenges of working in partnership with large and
generally poor communities who expect tangible benefits from their land claim in the
short term. The fact that many of the original strategic partners were companies
specially created for the purpose of participating in these ventures – with no
experience of inclusive approaches to business – clearly contributed to this general
weakness. On the part of the state, the detailed workings of the strategic model
which it has promoted were clearly not thought through prior to transferring control
of the farms – and vast public resources – to private-sector operators, in the
absence of any effective guarantees as to how these would be used. In short, neither
the commercial nor the social responsibility dimensions of these ventures have been
adequately defined in advance, and have proven virtually impossible to establish in
practice. 
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Arising from this study, the following recommendations are offered to the various
parties involved:
•  Communities reclaiming their land should be encouraged to become directly
involved in its use through a range of activities that include opportunities for small-
scale production and commercial partnerships, thereby ensuring a flow of benefits
in the short and longer terms.
•  Communal Property Associations and Trusts should be provided with legal and
administrative support to manage their affairs – including commercial agreements
and distribution of benefits – and to promote democratic participation by their
members.
•  Prospective strategic partners should be required to provide, in advance of any
agreement, detailed financial and business plans, a programme for inclusion of
community members, and firm guarantees as to the availability of investment
capital, and willingness to invest.
•  All-embracing strategic partnerships should be avoided, and replaced with more
specific agreements such as farm leases (e.g. for a period of five years),
management contracts, or contracts to purchase produce from community-run
farms.
•  Specialist agencies such as the Industrial Development Corporation and the
Development Bank of Southern Africa should be given greater responsibility for
managing state grants on behalf of communities, provision of credit, and general
commercial advice.
•  State agencies such as provincial departments of agriculture and the national
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform should develop a clear
strategy for supporting community-run commercial farms.
•  Where possible, attention should be given to breaking up existing commercial
farms into smaller units of production, rather than consolidating them as is currently
happening.
•  Emerging international experience in inclusive business models in agriculture
should be drawn upon in designing new land-use models for land claiming
communities in South Africa.
•  Ongoing monitoring and evaluation of land reform projects should be carried out
by a range of agencies in order to highlight problems and propose alternative
approaches.
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‘Inclusive business models’ have attracted renewed interest in recent years, as part of
wider debates about growing agricultural investment in developing countries. 
This report discusses joint ventures in South Africa’s agricultural sector. The South
African experience features major specificities linked to the country’s history and
recent land reform programme. Land reform beneficiaries entered into a range of joint
ventures with commercial partners. 
The report provides a cautionary tale for international debates about inclusive
business models, while also identifying more promising models that are now starting
to emerge.
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